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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the analysis of vaccination strategies in a stochas-
tic SIR (susceptible → infected → removed) model for the spread of an epidemic
amongst a population of individuals with a random network of social contacts that is
also partitioned into households. Under various vaccine action models, we consider
both household-based vaccination schemes, in which the way in which individuals are
chosen for vaccination depends on the size of the households in which they reside,
and acquaintance vaccination, which targets individuals of high degree in the social
network. For both types of vaccination scheme, assuming a large population with
few initial infectives, we derive a threshold parameter which determines whether or
not a large outbreak can occur and also the probability and fraction of the popu-
lation infected by such an outbreak. The performance of these schemes is studied
numerically, focusing on the influence of the household size distribution and the de-
gree distribution of the social network. We find that acquaintance vaccination can
significantly outperform the best household-based scheme if the degree distribution
of the social network is heavy-tailed. For household-based schemes, when the vaccine
coverage is insufficient to prevent a major outbreak and the vaccine is imperfect, we
find situations in which both the probability and size of a major outbreak under the
scheme which minimises the threshold parameter are larger than in the scheme which
maximises the threshold parameter.
Keywords: Branching process, configuration model, epidemic process, final size, random
graph, threshold behaviour, vaccination.
MSC Classifications: Primary 92D30 (Epidemiology); Secondary 60J85 (Applications
of BPs), 05C80 (Random graphs).
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1 Introduction and description of results
Mathematical models for the spread of infectious disease have much to offer in terms of un-
derstanding past outbreaks, predicting likely behaviours of future outbreaks and predicting
the effect of interventions or mitigating strategies. In the last decade or two there has been
considerable interest and work on network epidemic models. These involve supplanting the
traditional assumption of homogeneous mixing of homogeneous individuals with some ran-
dom graph structure, with specific interest in being able to control the degree distribution,
reflecting the varying numbers of people with which different individuals tend to interact.
Other structures, for example including households and stratification of populations, have
been studied for longer (Bartoszyn´ski, 1972; Ball, Mollison & Scalia-Tomba, 1997; Watson,
1972; Scalia-Tomba, 1986); but structures with a ‘social network’ type of interpretation
start around the turn of the millenium with the works of Diekmann, De Jong and Metz
(1998); Andersson (1997, 1998); Newman (2002). In this and most other papers in the
field we typically have in mind an infection spreading through a human population. How-
ever, much the same ideas apply to mathematical models of a variety of other motivating
applications, such as the spread of rumours or information through human populations,
infection or information spread through a population of other animals and virus spread
through a network of computers.
In this paper we build on the model of Ball, Sirl and Trapman (2009, 2010) which includes
household and network structure to include vaccination, with some emphasis on so-called
acquaintance vaccination (Cohen, Havlin & ben Avraham, 2003; Britton, Janson & Martin-
Lo¨f, 2007) as elucidated in Ball and Sirl (2013) in a model without household structure. In
the model of Ball et al. (2010), a population of fixed size is given social network structure
via the configuration model random graph (see e.g. Bolloba´s (1980); Newman, Strogatz
and Watts (2001); Newman (2002)) and the population is also partitioned into households
(see e.g. Ball et al. (1997)). A stochastic SIR (Susceptible–Infective–Removed) epidemic
model is then defined on this population structure. A first quantity of interest in this model
is the final size, which is the (random) number of initial susceptibles that are infected at
some point during the epidemic. In line with much of modern stochastic epidemic theory,
one can use branching process approximations to prove a threshold theorem (valid in the
large population limit) which determines whether the infection will necessarily die out
relatively quickly, resulting in a small final size, or whether it is possible for the epidemic
to take off and infect a substantial fraction of the population. These methods also yield
approximations for the probability that a supercritical epidemic will take off and using
closely related methods one can also study final size properties of such a large outbreak.
This paper provides tools for studying the effect of introducing vaccination (or some other
action which is implemented in advance of the spread of the epidemic) into this model.
Households-based vaccination schemes are those that can be described in terms of the
distribution of the number of vaccinated individuals in households of size n, for every
household size n in the population. This includes as special cases the situation when
we vaccinate individuals who are chosen uniformly at random from the population (the
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distributions are binomial) and vaccinating households at random (the distributions are
concentrated at 0 and n). Optimal schemes in this context often resemble the equalising
strategy where one vaccinates preferentially in larger households, there being more of a herd
immunity effect available to exploit in those larger households on top of the direct protection
of vaccinated individuals. Acquaintance vaccination schemes exploit the heterogeneity of
individuals’ connectivities in a network to preferentially target better-connected individuals
for vaccination. Instead of vaccinating individuals chosen from the population in some
way, one samples individuals and then vaccinates their friends—their acquaintances in the
network. This exploits the so-called friendship paradox, the observation that, for most
people, their friends on average have more friends than they do (Feld, 1991).
Our main theoretical results are the calculation of the asymptotic final size quantities
(i.e. characterization of appropriate branching process approximations) when we include
vaccination in the Ball et al. (2010) household-network model. This extends the results
of Becker and Starczak (1997) and Ball and Lyne (2002, 2006) on the standard households
model to have network-based (rather than homogeneous mixing) casual contacts. It also
extends results of Ball and Sirl (2013) on acquaintance vaccination in a population with
network (but not household) structure. We also explore the model numerically and find that
there can be substantial differences in the performance of the different vaccine allocation
strategies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we specify our models for
the population structure and evolution of the epidemic, then outline the analysis of the final
outcome of the epidemic and lastly introduce the model we use for the action of a vaccine
on individuals who receive it. In Section 3 we consider the effect of households-based
vaccination, including optimal households-based strategies, and in Section 4 we consider
the effect of acquaintance vaccination, analysing the same final outcome properties of the
epidemic. Some exploration of the behaviour of the model (mainly numerical) is presented
in Section 5. Lastly we offer some concluding remarks in Section 6. Details of several
of the longer calculations from Sections 2–4, as well as some standard results for small
homogenously mixing populations (households in our context), are given in the appendix.
2 Model, threshold behaviour and vaccination
2.1 Model
The model under consideration in this paper is that of Ball et al. (2010) for the spread of an
SIR epidemic on a finite random network incorporating household structure. We assume
that the population consists of N individuals and is partitioned into m households, of which
mn are of size n (n = 1, 2, . . .). Thus m =
∑∞
n=1mn and N =
∑∞
n=1 nmn. The network
of possible global (i.e. between-household) contacts is constructed using the configuration
model (with random, rather than specified, degree sequence). Thus each individual is
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assigned a number of ‘half-edges’ independently, according to an arbitrary but specified
discrete random variable D having mass function P (D = k) = pk (k = 0, 1, . . .), and then
all of the half-edges are paired up uniformly at random to form the edges in the graph
describing the global network. If the total number of half-edges is odd, we ignore the single
leftover half-edge.
Our analysis is asymptotic as the number of households m → ∞. We require that, as
m→∞, mn/m→ ρn (n = 1, 2, . . .), where (ρ1, ρ2, . . .) is a proper probability distribution
(i.e.
∑∞
n=1 ρn = 1) having finite mean µH =
∑∞
n=1 nρn. Thus µH is the mean household size
in the limiting population. We also require that µD = E[D] is finite. These assumptions
are sufficient for our analysis. If we make the stronger assumptions that σ2D = var(D) and∑∞
n=1 n
2ρn are both finite, then parallel edges and self-loops, between either individuals or
households, become sparse in the global network as n→∞.
The epidemic is initiated by a single individual, chosen uniformly at random from the
population, becoming infected, with the other individuals in the population all assumed to
be susceptible. The infectious periods of different infectives are each distributed according
to a random variable I, having an arbitrary but specified distribution. Throughout its
infectious period, a given infective makes infectious contact with any given member of its
household at the points of a Poisson process having rate λL and with any given global
neighbour at the points of a Poisson process with rate λG. (Note that λL and λG are
both individual to individual contact rates.) If an individual so contacted is susceptible
then it becomes infected, otherwise the contact has no effect. Contacted susceptibles are
immediately able to infect other individuals, i.e. there is no latent period. An infective
individual becomes removed at the end of its infectious period and plays no further role
in the epidemic. All infectious period, global degrees and Poisson processes are assumed
to be mutually independent. The epidemic ceases as soon as there is no infective in the
population.
For ease of exposition we have assumed that there is no latent period and that the epi-
demic is started by a single infective chosen uniformly at random from the population. As
explained in Ball et al. (2010), these assumptions may be relaxed without compromising
mathematical tractability. In particular, our results are related to the final outcome of the
epidemic, the distribution of which is invariant to very general assumptions concerning a
latent period (see e.g. Pellis, Ferguson and Fraser (2008)).
2.2 Threshold behaviour
2.2.1 Early stages of epidemic
Recall that the global network is formed by pairing up the half-edges uniformly at random.
It follows that in the early stages of an epidemic the probability that a global contact is
with an individual residing in a previously infected household is small, indeed it is zero
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in the limit as m → ∞. Thus, in the early stages of an epidemic, the process of infected
households can be approximated by a branching process. The individuals in this branching
process correspond to infected households in the epidemic process, and the offspring of a
given individual in the branching process are all households that are contacted globally by
members of the local (within-household) epidemic in the parent household.
The offspring distribution for this branching process is usually different in the initial gener-
ation than in all subsequent generations. The number of global neighbours that the initial
infective in the initial infected household may infect is distributed according to D, as that
individual is chosen uniformly at random from the entire population. The number of global
neighbours that the initial infective in any subsequent infected household (in the branching
process approximation) may infect is distributed according to D˜−1, where D˜ is the degree
of a typical neighbour of a typical individual in the network. The −1 arises because such an
initial infective has been infected through the global network, so one of its neighbours (i.e.
its infector) is not available for further infection. Note that a given half-edge is k times as
likely to be paired with a half-edge emanating from an individual with degree k than with
one emanating from an individual with degree 1, so P (D˜ = k) = µ−1D kpk (k = 1, 2, . . .).
The distributions of D and D˜− 1 are equal if and only if D has a Poisson distribution. For
any non-negative integer valued random variable X, we denote its probability generating
function (PGF) by fX , so fX(s) = E[s
X ] (0 ≤ s ≤ 1). We note for future reference that
fD˜−1(s) = f
′
D(s)/µD.
The approximation of the early stages of the epidemic process by the above branching pro-
cess is made mathematically fully rigorous in Ball et al. (2009) and Ball and Sirl (2012). The
latter shows that a sequence of epidemic processes, indexed by m, and the approximating
branching process can be constructed on the same probability space so that, as m → ∞,
the number of households ultimately infected in the epidemic process converges almost
surely to the total progeny of the branching process. Thus, provided m is large, whether
or not the epidemic can become established and lead to a major outbreak is determined by
whether or not the branching process is supercritical.
Let C and C˜ be random variables describing the number of offspring of the initial and
a typical subsequent individual, respectively, in the branching process. Then standard
branching process theory (e.g. Haccou, Jagers & Vatutin, 2005, Theorem 5.2), gives that
the extinction probability of the branching process is strictly less than one if and only if
R∗ = E[C˜] > 1. Thus R∗ serves as a threshold parameter for the epidemic model. We now
outline the calculation of R∗. Further details are given in (Ball et al., 2010).
First note that, since the degree and household size of an individual are independent, the
probability that a typical globally infected individual resides in a household of size n is
given by ρ˜n = µ
−1
H nρn (n = 1, 2, . . .). (An individual chosen uniformly at random from
the population is n times as likely to reside in a given household of size n than in a given
household of size 1.) Thus,
E[C˜] =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜nE[C˜
(n)], (2.1)
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where C˜(m) is the number of global infections emanating from a typical size-n single-
household epidemic initiated by a single infective who is infected through the global net-
work. Consider such a size-n single-household epidemic. Label the household members
0, 1, . . . , n− 1, where 0 is the initial infective, and write
C˜(n) = C0 +
n−1∑
i=1
χiCi, (2.2)
where χi = 1 if individual i is infected by the single-household epidemic, otherwise χi = 0,
and Ci is the number of global infections made by individual i (assuming it is infected). Let
T (n) =
∑n−1
i=1 χi be the final size of the single-household epidemic, not including the initial
infective, and µ(n)(λL) = E[T
(n)]. (A formula for µ(n)(λL) is given in equation (A.26) in
Appendix A.7.) Whether or not a given individual, i say, is infected by the single-household
epidemic is independent of its infectious period, so χi and Ci are independent. Thus, taking
expectations of (2.2) and exploiting symmetries yields
E[C˜(n)] = E[C0] + µ
(n)(λL)E[C1]. (2.3)
The probability that individual 0 infects a given global neighbour is pG = 1−E[e−λGI ] and
the number of uninfected global neighbours of individual 0 is distributed according to D˜−1.
Thus E[C0] = pGµD˜−1, where µD˜−1 = E[D˜ − 1] = µD + σ
2
D
µD
− 1. Similarly, E[C1] = pGµD,
since the number of uninfected global neighbours of individual 1 is distributed according
to D. Substituting these results into (2.3), and then into (2.1), yields
R∗ = pG
[
µD˜−1 + µD
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜nµ
(n)(λL)
]
. (2.4)
Let pmaj be the probability that a major outbreak occurs. Then standard branching process
theory (e.g. Haccou et al. (2005, Theorem 5.2)), shows that pmaj = 1 − fC(σ), where σ
is the smallest solution of fC˜(s) = s in [0, 1]. Note that, analagous to (2.1), fC(s) =∑∞
i=1 ρ˜nfC(n)(s) and fC˜(s) =
∑∞
n=1 ρ˜nfC˜(n)(s). Details of the calculation of fC(n) and fC˜(n)
are given in Appendices A.2 and A.3. As noted in Ball et al. (2010, Section 3.2), these
calculations are much simpler in the case where the infectious period is constant.
2.2.2 Final outcome of major outbreak
We now consider the fraction of the population that are ultimately infected by an epidemic
that takes off. The key tool we use is the susceptibility set (Ball, 2000; Ball & Lyne,
2001; Ball & Neal, 2002), which we now describe. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} denote the entire
population of N individuals. For each i ∈ N , by sampling from the infectious period
distribution and then the relevant Poisson processes for local and global contacts, draw up
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a (random) list of individuals i would make infectious contact with if it was to become
infected. Then construct a random directed graph on N , in which for any pair, (i, j) say,
of individuals there is an arc from i to j if and only if j is in i’s list. The susceptibility set
of a given individual, i say, consists of those individuals from which there is a chain of arcs
to i in the graph (including i itself). Note that any given individual is ultimately infected
by the epidemic if and only the initial infective belongs to its susceptibility set.
As for the early stages of an epidemic, we can approximate the susceptibility set of an
individual, i say, chosen uniformly at random from the population, by a households-based
branching process. We first consider i’s local susceptibility set, i.e. the susceptibility set
obtained when only local (within-household) contacts are considered. Suppose that this
local susceptibility set has size M (n) + 1, where n denotes the size of i’s household. (The
probability mass function of M (n) is given by equation (A.24) in Appendix A.6.) Let B be
the number of individuals, who are not in i’s household, that in the random directed graph
have an edge leading directly to one of the M (n)+1 individuals in i’s local susceptibility set.
Each individual in i’s local susceptibility set has global degree distributed independently
according to D, and, as m→∞, each global neighbour of i’s local susceptibility set enters
i’s susceptibility set independently with probability pG. Thus, taking expectations with
respect to i’s household size,
fB(s) =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜nfB(n)(s), (2.5)
where
fB(n)(s) = fD(1− pG + pGs)fM(n)(fD(1− pG + pGs)). (2.6)
The above B individuals form the first generation of our approximating branching process.
We next consider each of these B individuals in turn, construct the local susceptibility
sets in their respective households (which are distinct with probability tending to one as
m→∞) and then examine the global neighbours of these local susceptibility sets to obtain
the second generation of the approximating branching process, and so on. Note that the
initial individual in each of these B local susceptibility sets has degree distributed according
to D˜, so, as previously, the offspring distribution for the branching process is different for
the initial individual than for all subsequent individuals. If we let B˜ denote the offspring
random variable of a typical non-initial individual, then arguing as in the derivation of
(2.5),
fB˜(s) =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜nfB˜(n)(s), (2.7)
where
fB˜(n)(s) = fD˜−1(1− pG + pGs)fM(n)(fD(1− pG + pGs)). (2.8)
The probability that the approximating branching process survives (i.e. does not go extinct)
is given by z = 1 − fB(ξ), where ξ is the smallest solution of fB˜(s) = s in [0, 1]. It is
straightforward to show that E[B˜] = E[C˜], so z > 0 if and only if R∗ > 1. Moreover, if
7
R∗ > 1 then z is the expected proportion of the population that is ultimately infected by
a major outbreak in the limit as m → ∞; see Ball et al. (2009) for a formal proof when
all the households have the same size. Furthermore, the method of proof of Ball, Sirl and
Trapman (2014, Theorem 3.4) can be adapted to show that, as m→∞, the proportion of
the population that is ultimately infected by a major outbreak converges in probability to
z. Thus we refer to z as the relative final size of a major outbreak.
2.3 Vaccination
In modelling vaccination there are two distinct aspects that must be modelled: (i) who gets
vaccinated and (ii) what happens to those who are vaccinated. Vaccine allocation models
(addressing the former issue) are our focus in this paper. We now outline the vaccine action
models (addressing the latter aspect) that we allow for in our analysis.
We use a model for vaccine action, proposed by Becker and Starczak (1998), in which the
vaccine response of an individual who is vaccinated is described by a random vector (A,B),
where A denotes the relative susceptibility (compared to an unvaccinated individual) and
B the relative infectivity if the vaccinated individual becomes infected. Thus all Poisson
processes concerning potential infection of the individual have their rates multiplied by A
and the Poisson processes governing the contacts the individual makes, if infected, have
their rates multiplied by B. The vaccine responses of distinct vaccinees are assumed to be
mutually independent. Within this framework we consider two special cases, the all-or-
nothing and the non-random vaccine responses.
The all-or-nothing model (see e.g. Halloran, Haber and Longini (1992)) is obtained by
setting P ((A,B) = (0, 0)) = 1 − P ((A,B) = (1, 1)) = ε, so vaccinated individuals are
rendered completely immune with probability ε, otherwise the vaccine has no effect. The
non-random model (see e.g. Ball and Lyne (2006)) assumes that P ((A,B) = (a, b)) = 1,
for some (a, b), so all vaccinated individuals respond identically. An important special case
is the leaky model (see e.g. Halloran et al. (1992)), when b = 1, so vaccination does not
affect an individual’s ability to transmit the disease if they become infected. Setting ε = 1
in the all-or-nothing model or a = b = 1 in the non-random model yields a perfect vaccine
response; that is one in which all vaccinated individuals are rendered completely immune.
3 Households based vaccination
3.1 Introduction
In this section we consider vaccine allocation strategies based on household size and deter-
mine their impact on R∗, pmaj and z under the all-or-nothing and non-random vaccine action
models. For n = 1, 2, . . . and v = 0, 1, . . . , n, let xnv denote the proportion of households
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of size n that have v members vaccinated. Let pV denote the proportion of the population
that is vaccinated, i.e. the vaccination coverage. Then pV is also the probability that an
individual chosen uniformly at random from the population is vaccinated. Conditioning on
the size of such an individual’s household yields
pV =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜n
n∑
v=0
v
n
xnv. (3.1)
We derive results for an arbitrary but specified vaccine allocation however in the numerical
studies we consider four allocation schemes: uniformly chosen households, uniformly chosen
individuals, ‘best’ and ‘worst’. In the uniformly chosen households scheme, households
are chosen uniformly at random and all of their members are vaccinated. Thus, if the
vaccination coverage is pV , xnv = pV δvn + (1− pV )δv0 (n = 1, 2, . . .; v = 0, 1, . . . , n), where
δvk = 1 if v = k and δvk = 0 if v 6= k. In the uniformly chosen individuals scheme,
individuals are chosen uniformly at random and vaccinated, so xnv =
(
n
v
)
pvV (1 − pV )n−v
(n = 1, 2, . . .; v = 0, 1, . . . , n). The best and worst schemes are the allocations that make
R∗ respectively as small as possible and as large as possible, for a given vaccination coverage.
3.2 All-or-nothing vaccine action
To analyse the consequences of a vaccination scheme using an all-or-nothing vaccine action
model it is convenient to use the concept of a potential infectious global contact. Consider a
given infected individual and a given global neighbour of that infected individual. Then that
neighbour is a potential infectious global contact of the infective, if it is in that infective’s
list of individuals it makes infectious contact with (see the start of Section 2.2.2). The
potential infectious global contact becomes an actual infectious global contact if either the
neighbour is unvaccinated or it is vaccinated but the vaccination fails.
The early stages of an epidemic with vaccination is approximated by a branching process of
(potentially) infected households, and the offspring of a given individual in the branching
process are all households with which members of the single-household epidemic in the
parent household make a potential global infectious contact. As in the case without vacci-
nation, the offspring distribution of this branching process is usually different in the initial
generation from all subsequent generations. Let C˜ ′ denote the offspring random variable for
a non-initial individual. Conditioning first on the size of the corresponding household and
then on the number of people vaccinated in that household yields, in an obvious notation,
fC˜′(s) =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜n
n∑
v=0
xnvfC˜′n,v(s). (3.2)
To determine fC˜′n,v(s), consider a household in state (n, v), i.e. of size n having v mem-
bers vaccinated. For k = 0, 1, . . . , v, the probability that k vaccinations are successful is(
v
k
)
εk(1−ε)v−k, and given that k vaccinations are successful, the probability that the initial
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potentially contacted individual in that household is susceptible and thus triggers a local
epidemic is n−k
n
. Moreover, if such a local epidemic is triggered, the number of potential
infectious global contacts emanating from the local epidemic is distributed as C˜(n−k). Thus,
fC˜′n,v(s) =
v∑
k=0
(
v
k
)
εk(1− ε)v−k
[
(n− k)
k
fC˜(n−k)(s) +
k
n
]
. (3.3)
The distribution of the offspring random variable, C ′ say, for the initial generation depends
on how the initial infective for the network-households model is chosen. For n = 1, 2, . . . and
v = 0, 1, . . . , n, let pVn,v be the probability that a vaccinated individual chosen uniformly at
random resides in a household in state (n, v) and let pUn,v be the corresponding probability
for an unvaccinated individual. Then
pVn,v =
ρ˜nxnv
v
n
pV
and pUn,v =
ρ˜nxnv
(
1− v
n
)
1− pV . (3.4)
Thus, if the epidemic is started by an individual chosen uniformly at random from all
unvaccinated individuals being infected, then C ′ is distributed as C ′U , where
fC′U (s) =
∞∑
n=1
n−1∑
v=0
pUn,v
v∑
k=0
(
v
k
)
εk(1− ε)v−kfC(n−k)(s).
Alternatively, if the epidemic is started by choosing a vaccinated individual uniformly at
random, who triggers an outbreak only if its vaccination fails, then C ′ is distributed as C ′V ,
where
fC′V (s) = ε+ (1− ε)
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=1
pVn,v
v∑
k=1
(
v − 1
k − 1
)
εk−1(1− ε)v−kfC(n−k)(s).
The probability of a major outbreak may now be calculated as at the end of Section 2.2.1.
Again, the formulae simplify appreciably if the infectious period is constant.
A post-vaccination threshold parameter is given by Rv = E[C˜
′]. Let f ′
C˜′(s) denote the first
derivative of fC˜′(s). Then Rv = f
′
C˜′(1), and differentiating (3.2) and (3.3) yields
Rv =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜n
n∑
v=0
xnvµn,v, (3.5)
where µn,v = E[C˜
′
n,v] is given by
µn,v =
v∑
k=0
(
v
k
)
εk(1− ε)v−k
(
n− k
k
)
E[C˜(n−k)].
As with the case of no vaccination, we can determine the relative final size of a major
outbreak by considering a households-based branching process that approximates the sus-
ceptibility set of a typical individual. As with the forward process, it is convenient to
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consider potential global neighbours when constructing this branching process. Thus we
start with an individual, i∗ say, chosen uniformly at random from the population, construct
its local susceptibility set, taking the vaccine status of individuals in the household into
account, then determine which global neighbours of individuals in this local susceptibil-
ity set would enter the susceptibility set of i∗ if they were susceptible (i.e. unvaccinated
or unsuccessfully vaccinated). These individuals correspond to the first generation of the
approximating backward branching process. Suppose that there are B′ such individuals.
Next we take each of these B′ individuals in turn, first determine whether they really do
enter the susceptibility set of i∗ (this happens with probability 1 if the individual is unvac-
cinated and with probability 1−ε if it is vaccinated, independently for distinct individuals)
and if they do enter the susceptibility set of i∗, determine the number of potential global
neighbours of its local susceptibility set to obtain its offspring in the branching process,
and so on.
Let B˜′ be the offspring random variable for any non-initial individual in this backward
branching process. Conditioning first on the state (n, v) of that individual’s household and
then on whether it joins the susceptibility set of i∗, we obtain that
fB˜′(s) =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜n
n∑
v=0
xnvfB˜′n,v(s),
where
fB˜′n,v(s) =
v∑
k=0
(
v
k
)
εk(1− ε)v−k
[
(n− k)
k
fB˜(n−k)(s) +
k
n
]
.
The distribution of B′ depends on how the initial individual i∗ is chosen. If i∗ is chosen
uniformly at random from all unvaccinated individuals, then B′ is distributed as B′U , say,
and conditioning on the state (n, v) of i∗’s household yields
fB′U (s) =
∞∑
n=1
n−1∑
v=0
pUn,v
v∑
k=0
(
v
k
)
εk(1− ε)v−kfB(n−k)(s),
whilst if i∗ is chosen uniformly at random from all vaccinated individuals, then B′ is
distributed as B′V , where
fB′V (s) =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=1
pVn,v
v∑
k=0
(
v
k
)
εk(1− ε)v−k
[
(n− k)
n
fB(n−k)(s) +
k
n
]
.
Let ξV be the smallest solution of fB˜′(s) = s in [0, 1]. Then the proportion of unvaccinated
individuals that are ultimately infected by a major outbreak is zU = 1 − fB′U (ξV ) and
the corresponding proportion for vaccinated individuals is zV = 1 − fB′V (ξV ). The overall
proportion of the population infected by a major outbreak is z = pV z
V + (1− pV )zU .
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3.3 Non-random vaccine action
Analysing the consequences of a vaccination scheme using a non-random vaccine action
model is more difficult than with an all-or-nothing vaccine action model since disease spread
is now genuinely two type. Thus we now consider two types of individual: type-U , unvacci-
nated, and type-V , vaccinated. The early stages of the epidemic can again be approximated
by a branching process of infected households. This is now a two-type branching process,
with the type of an infected household being given by the type of the initial case in that
household. The offspring of a given individual in the branching process correspond to
the households that are contacted globally by members of that individual’s corresponding
single-household epidemic in the epidemic process.
Let CU = (CUU , CUV ) denote the offspring random variable for the initial individual in the
above branching process, given that individual is of type U , and let CV = (CV U , CV V ) be
the corresponding offspring random variable when the initial individual has type V . Thus,
for example, CUU and CUV are respectively the number of unvaccinated and vaccinated
global infections that emanate from the initially infected household, given that the first in-
fective in that household is unvaccinated. Define C˜
U
= (C˜UU , C˜UV ) and C˜
V
= (C˜V U , C˜V V )
similarly for subsequent individuals in the branching process. For s = (sU , sV ) ∈ [0, 1]2,
let fCU (s) = E[s
CUU
U s
CUV
V ] and define fCV (s), fC˜U (s) and fC˜V (s) similarly. (Here and
henceforth, for any discrete random vector X we denote its joint PGF by fX .) Recall that
when the network of global contacts is formed half edges are paired uniformly at random.
It follows that, for A ∈ {U, V },
f
C˜
A(s) =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
pAn,vfC˜An,v
(s),
where C˜
A
n,v is a random vector giving the numbers of unvaccinated and vaccinated global
infections that emanate from a non-initial infected household of size n, having v members
vaccinated, whose primary case is of type A. The distribution of CU and CV depends on
how the initial infective is chosen. If it is chosen uniformly at random from all individuals
of the appropriate type in the population, then, for A ∈ {U, V },
fCA(s) =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
pAn,vfCAn,v(s),
where CAn,v is defined analogously to C˜
A
n,v but for the initial infected household.
Let
M˜ =
[
m˜UU m˜UV
m˜V U m˜V V
]
,
where, for example, m˜UU = E[C˜UU ]. The post-vaccination threshold parameter Rv is given
by the dominant eigenvalue (a real, positive eigenvalue of maximum modulus) of M˜ . It is
12
well known (e.g. Haccou et al. (2005, p. 123)) that, provided m˜UV m˜V U 6= 0, the two-type
branching process has non-zero probability of surviving if and only if Rv > 1. Moreover,
if m˜UV m˜V U 6= 0 and Rv > 1, then the survival probability (and hence the probability of a
major outbreak) can be determined as follows. Let σ = (σU , σV ) be the unique solution in
[0, 1)2 of the equations
σU = fC˜U (σU , σV ), σV = fC˜V (σU , σV ).
Then, if the epidemic is started by an unvaccinated individual chosen uniformly at random
from the population becoming infected, the probability of a major outbreak is pUmaj = 1−
fCU (σ). The corresponding probability when the initial infective is a vaccinated individual
is pVmaj = 1−fCV (σ). Calculation of the PGFs fCUn,v , fCVn,v , fC˜Un,v and fC˜Vn,v , which is rather
involved unless the infectious period is constant, is described in Appendix A.4. Calculation
of M˜ , which is sufficient for determining optimal vaccination strategies, is simpler and we
now outline it.
Consider first a local (single-household) epidemic in a household in state (n, v), initiated by
one of the household members becoming infected. Let T
(n,v)
U and T
(n,v)
V denote the number
of unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals ultimately infected by this local epidemic, not
including the initial case. For A,A′ ∈ {U, V }, let µ(n,v)(A,A′) be the mean of T (n,v)A′ given
that the initial case is of type A. (Calculation of µ(n,v)(A,A′) is described in Appendix A.7.)
Also, define the marginal transmission probabilities pNRG (U,U), p
NR
G (U, V ), p
NR
G (V, U) and
pNRG (V, V ) between unvaccinated and vaccinated global neighbours, where, for example,
pNRG (U, V ) is the probability that an unvaccinated infective infects a given vaccinated global
neighbour. Then
PNRG =
[
pNRG (U,U) p
NR
G (U, V )
pNRG (U, V ) p
NR
G (V, V )
]
=
[
1− φI(λG) 1− φI(aλG)
1− φI(bλG) 1− φI(abλG)
]
, (3.6)
where φI(θ) = E[e
−θI ] (θ ≥ 0) is the moment generating function (MGF) of the infectious
period random variable I.
Taking expectations with respect to the state (n, v) of the infected household shows that,
for A,A′ ∈ {U, V },
m˜AA′ =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
pAn,vm˜
(n,v)
AA′ , (3.7)
where m˜
(n,v)
AA′ is defined analogously to m˜AA′ but for a household in state (n, v). Further,
arguing as in the derivations of (2.3) and (2.4), yields
m˜
(nv)
AA′ =
[
µD˜−1p
NR
G (A,A
′) + µD
(
µ(n,v)(A,U)pNRG (U,A
′) + µ(n,v)(A, V )pNRG (V,A
′)
)]
pA′ ,
(3.8)
where pU = 1− pV . Hence, if we let
F =
[
FUU FUV
FV U FV V
]
and DV =
[
1− pV 0
0 pV
]
,
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where, for A,A′ ∈ {U, V },
FAA′ =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
pAn,vµ
(n,v)(A,A′),
then (3.7) and (3.8) yield
M˜ = (µD˜−1I + µDF )P
NR
G DV . (3.9)
Turning to the relative final size of a major outbreak, we consider a households-based
branching process that approximates the susceptibility set of a given individual. This is
now a two-type branching process, with type (U or V ) corresponding to the type of the
primary member of the corresponding local susceptibility set. Define the offspring random
variablesBU = (BUU , BUV ), B
V = (BV U , BV V ), B˜
U
= (B˜UU , B˜UV ) and B˜
V
= (B˜V U , B˜V V )
for this branching process in the obvious fashion (cf. the forward process offspring random
variables CU , CV , C˜
U
and C˜
V
and the notation used in Section 3.2). We determine first
the PGFs f
B˜
U (s) and f
B˜
V (s).
First note that, for A ∈ {U, V }, conditioning on the state (n, v) of a household yields, in
obvious notation,
f
B˜
A(s) =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
pAn,vfB˜An,v
(s).
Fix A ∈ {U, V } and (n, v), and let M (n,v)A = (M (n,v)AU ,M (n,v)AV ), where M (n,v)AU and M (n,v)AV
are respectively the numbers of unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals, not including i∗
itself, in the local susceptibility set of a typical type-A individual, i∗ say, that resides in a
household in state (n, v). Then B˜
A
n,v admits the decomposition
B˜
A
n,v = B˜
A0
n,v +
M
(n,v)
AU∑
i=1
B˜
AV
n,v (i) +
M
(n,v)
AV∑
j=1
B˜
AV
n,v (j), (3.10)
where B˜
A0
n,v, B˜
AU
n,v (i) and B˜
AV
n,v (j) are the contributions to B˜
A
n,v from the primary individual
i∗, the ith secondary unvaccinated member and the jth secondary vaccinated member of
i∗’s local susceptibility set, respectively. Let Di∗ denote the number of neighbours i∗ has
in the global network, so Di∗ ∼ D˜, and recall that one of these global neighbours is used
when i∗ joins the susceptibility set process. Thus,
BA0n,V =
Di∗−1∑
k=1
χAk ,
where χAk = (1, 0) if the kth global neighbour of i
∗ is unvaccinated and joins the suscepti-
bility set process, χAk = (0, 1) if this neighbour is vaccinated and joins the susceptibility set
process, and χAk = (0, 0) otherwise. Note that, independently, each such global neighbour
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is vaccinated with probability pV , and it joins the susceptibility set process with probability
pNRG (U,A) if it is unvaccinated and with probability p
NR
G (V,A) if it is vaccinated. Thus
fBA0n,V (s) = fD˜−1(p
A(s)),
where
pA(s) = fχA1 (s)
= (1− pV )pNRG (U,A)sU + pV pNRG (V,A)sV + 1− (1− pV )pNRG (U,A)− pV pNRG (V,A).
A similar argument shows that f
B˜
AU
n,v (i)
(s) = fD(p
U(s)) and f
B˜
AV
n,v (j)
(s) = fD(p
V (s)), and
exploiting the mutual independence of all random quantities in (3.10) except the compo-
nents of M
(n,v)
A then yields
f
B˜
A
n,v
(s) = fD˜−1(p
A(s))f
M
(n,v)
A
(fD(p
U(s)), fD(p
V (s))).
The distribution of BU and BV depend on how the initial individual for the susceptibility
set process is chosen. For A ∈ {U, V }, if this initial individual is chosen uniformly at
random from all type-A individuals in the population, then
fBA(s) =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
pAn,vfBAn,v(s),
where
fBAn,v(s) = fD(p
A(s))f
M
(n,v)
A
(fD(p
U(s)), fD(p
V (s))).
Suppose that m˜UV m˜V U 6= 0 and Rv > 1. Let ξ = (ξU , ξV ) be the unique solution in [0, 1)2
of the equations
ξU = fB˜U (ξU , ξV ), ξV = fB˜V (ξU , ξV ).
Then the proportions of unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals that are infected by a
major epidemic are given by zU = fBU (ξU , ξV ) and z
V = fBV (ξU , ξV ), respectively.
3.4 Optimal vaccination strategies
A main aim of a vaccination scheme is to reduce the threshold parameter R∗ to below
one, i.e. to make Rv ≤ 1, and thus prevent a major outbreak occurring. The vaccine
response may be such that Rv > 1 even if the entire population is vaccinated, in which case
vaccination by itself is insufficient to be sure of preventing a major outbreak. However, if
R∗ > 1 and it is possible to make Rv ≤ 1 then it is of interest to determine the allocation
of vaccines that reduces Rv to 1 with the minimum vaccination coverage pV .
Suppose that the population has a maximum household size nmax < ∞. Then pV is a
linear function of xnv (n = 1, 2, . . ., nmax; v = 0, 1, . . . , n) (recall (3.1)), as is Rv when the
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vaccine action is all-or-nothing (recall (3.5)). Thus in this case determining the allocation
of vaccines that (a) minimises pV subject to Rv ≤ 1 or (b) minimises Rv subject to an
upper bound on pV are both linear programming problems. Moreover, as we outline below,
the method of Ball and Lyne (2002, 2006) can be used to construct explicitly the solutions
of these linear programming problems. The situation is in general more complicated if
the vaccine action is non-random, since then Rv is then the dominant eigenvalue of the
matrix M˜ , and the corresponding optimisation problems are non-linear. However, the
problem is linear if rank(M˜) = 1, a sufficient condition for which is rank(PNRG ) = 1, i.e.
pNRG (U,U)p
NR
G (V, V ) = p
NR
G (U, V )p
NR
G (V, U). Note that rank(P
NR
G ) = 1 if either a = 1 or
b = 1, so a leaky vaccine response satisfies this constraint.
Consider the non-random vaccine response and suppose that rank(M˜) = 1. Then Rv =
trace(M˜) and, recalling (3.9), it follows using (3.4), (3.7) and (3.8) that
Rv =
∞∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
ρ˜nxnvµ
NR
n,v , (3.11)
where
µNRn,v =
(
1− v
n
){
µ˜D−1pNRG (U,U) + µD
[
µ(n,v)(U,U)pNRG (U,U) + µ
(n,v)(U, V )pNRG (V, U)
]}
+
v
n
{
µ˜D−1pNRG (V, V ) + µD
[
µ(n,v)(V, U)pNRG (U, V ) + µ
(n,v)(V, V )pNRG (V, V )
]}
.
(3.12)
Observe that, when rank(M˜) = 1, Rv takes the same form as for the all-or-nothing vaccine
response; compare (3.11) and (3.5).
To characterise the optimal vaccination schemes in these cases, it is convenient to consider
a finite population of m households, with maximum household size nmax. Let mn = mρn
be the number of households of size n and let hnv = mnxnv be the number of households
in state (n, v). Then ρ˜n = nmn/N , where N is the total population size, and, writing µn,v
for µAoNn,v or µ
NR
n,v , as appropriate, (3.5) or (3.11) implies that
Rv =
nmax∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
hnvMn,v, (3.13)
where Mn,v = nµn,v/N , and (3.1) yields
pV =
1
N
nmax∑
n=1
n∑
v=0
vhnv. (3.14)
Observe that (3.13) implies that Rv is obtained by summing Mn,v over all households in
the population. For n = 1, 2, . . . , nmax and v = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, let Gn,v = Mn,v −Mn,v+1
be the reduction in Rv obtained by vaccinating one further individual in a household
16
in state (n, v). If Gn,v is decreasing in v for each fixed n (so successive vaccinations in
the same household have diminishing returns), then it is straightforward to determine
optimal vaccination schemes (Ball & Lyne, 2002, 2006). One simply orders the states
(n, v) according to decreasing Gn,v, and then uses this ordering to determine the order
in which individuals in the population are vaccinated, stopping the process when either
the vaccination coverage reaches the desired level or when Rv ≤ 1, depending on the
optimisation problem under consideration. (The ‘worst’ scheme is obtained by vaccinating
whole households in increasing order of Mn,0 −Mn,n.) If for some n, say n = n′, Gn′,v is
not decreasing in v, then only those states, (n′, v′) say, on the lower edge of the convex hull
of {(v,Gn′,v) : v = 0, 1, . . . , n′ − 1} can be part of an optimal vaccination scheme. It is still
possible to give explicit solutions of associated optimisation problems (cf. Ball, Britton and
Lyne (2004)), and of ‘worst’ schemes, but the details are more involved.
4 Acquaintance vaccination
4.1 Introduction
The acquaintance vaccine allocation model proposed by Cohen et al. (2003) and further
analysed by Britton et al. (2007), both in the setting of a population modeled by the
configuration model (without household structure), is as follows. Each individual in the
population is sampled independently a Poisson distributed number of times, with mean
κ > 0, and each time an individual is sampled it chooses one of its neighbours uniformly
at random, with replacement, and that neighbour is vaccinated. If a sampled individual
has no neighbours then that sampling is ignored. Individuals are vaccinated at most once,
even if they are chosen to be vaccinated more than once.
If the vaccine is perfect then the early stages and final outcome of an epidemic with this
acquaintance vaccination model can be analysed relatively easily using branching process
approximations. Essentially this is because the epidemic involves only unvaccinated in-
dividuals, and the degrees of the neighbours of an unvaccinated individual are mutually
independent. However, if the vaccine is imperfect, then the epidemic may also involve
vaccinated individuals and the degrees of the neighbours of a vaccinated individual are
dependent. (A low-degree neighbour of a given individual, A say, is more likely to nomi-
nate A for vaccination than a high-degree neighbour but, if A is vaccinated, at least one
of A’s neighbours nominated A for vaccination.) It follows that the independence property
required for a branching process approximation breaks down. This dependence can be over-
come if individuals are also typed by their degree but, unless the support of D is small, the
calculations become computationally prohibitively expensive. Indeed, infinite-type branch-
ing processes are required if the support of D is countably infinite. For these reasons,
Ball and Sirl (2013) introduced an alternative acquaintance vaccine allocation model and
analysed it in the setting of a standard network model (i.e. without households). We now
extend this analysis to the network-households model.
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4.2 Model and preliminary results
We assume that each individual is sampled independently with probability pS and then
each sampled individual nominates each of its global neighbours independently with prob-
ability pN . All individuals that are nominated at least once are then vaccinated. Thus
individuals are sampled only once and it is easily seen that the degrees of the neighbours of
both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals are mutually independent, thus facilitating
branching process approximations which do not involve typing by degree.
We approximate the early stages of the epidemic, with vaccination, by a multitype branch-
ing process of infected households, in which households are typed by the type of their
primary (globally contacted) case. Such primary cases are typed by (i) whether they are
named (N), vaccinated (V ) or unvaccinated (U) and (ii) whether or not they are sampled
and thus might name their neighbour for vaccination (S and Sc). Here N means that a
primary case was named by its global infector, and therefore is vaccinated; V means that
it is not named by its global infector but it is nevertheless vaccinated (i.e. it is named by
another neighbour) and U means that it is unvaccinated (i.e. not named by any of its neigh-
bours). Thus there are 6 types of infected households, which for notational convenience we
give the following numerical indices:
1 2 3 4 5 6
(N,S) (V, S) (U, S) (N,Sc) (V, Sc) (U, Sc)
Secondary infected cases in a household, and also the primary case in the initially infected
household, need only to be typed V or U , according to whether or not they are vaccinated.
A similar typing is used for the backward process. In Section 4.3 we determine the mean
offspring matrix for the forward process, and hence the post-vaccination threshold param-
eter Rv, and in Section 4.4 we determine the offspring distribution PGFs for the backward
process, and hence the relative final size of a major epidemic. The offspring distribution
PGFs for the forward process are generally more complicated and their calculation is de-
scribed in Appendix A.5. We first derive some elementary properties pertaining to this
acquaintance vaccination model.
First, note that the probability that an individual is not named by a given neighbour is
1− pSpN , so the probability it is vaccinated is
pV = 1−
∞∑
d=0
pd(1− pSpN)d = 1− fD(1− pSpN), (4.1)
which, of course, also gives the vaccination coverage. Let DV and DU denote the degree of
a typical vaccinated and unvaccinated individual, respectively. Then,
P (DU = d) =
P (D = d)P (U |D = d)
P (U)
=
pd(1− pSpN)d
1− pV (d = 0, 1, . . .) (4.2)
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and, similarly,
P (DV = d) =
pd(1− (1− pSpN)d)
pV
(d = 1, 2, . . .). (4.3)
Note that whether or not an individual is sampled is independent of its degree. Thus
primary cases of types 1 and 4 have the same degree distribution, as do primary cases of
types 2 and 5, and primary cases of types 3 and 6. Let D˜N , D˜V and D˜U denote generic
random variables having these respective distributions. First note that D˜N
D
= D˜. Second,
consider a typical unvaccinated primary case. It has unconditional degree distribution D˜
but, in addition to not being named by its infector, we also know that it is not named by
any of its other global neighbours. Thus
P (D˜U = d) =
P (D˜ = d)P (U |D˜ = d)
1− p˜V =
p˜d(1− pNpS)d−1
1− p˜V (d = 1, 2, . . .), (4.4)
where
p˜V =
∞∑
d=1
p˜d(1− (1− pNpS)d−1) = 1− fD˜−1(1− pNpS) (4.5)
is the probability that a typical unnamed neighbour of an infector is vaccinated. Similarly,
P (D˜V = d) =
p˜d(1− (1− pNpS)d−1)
p˜V
(d = 2, 3, . . .). (4.6)
4.3 Threshold parameter
As far as is possible, we treat the all-or-nothing and non-random models simultaneously.
In contrast to Section 3.2, when analysing the all-or-nothing vaccine response, we consider
actual, rather than potential, global infections. The forward branching process for both
models is then similar to that used for the non-random model in Section 3.3, except now
there are 6 types of individuals. As always, the offspring distributions are different in the
initial generation from subsequent generations, but only those for the latter are required to
determine the threshold parameter. For i = 1, 2, . . . , 6, let C˜i = (C˜i1, C˜i2, . . . , C˜i6) denote
the offspring random variable for a type-i non-initial individual in the forward branching
process. Thus C˜ij is the number of type-j primary household cases emanating from a
typical single household epidemic that is initiated by a single type-i primary case. Our
goal is to determine the matrix M˜ = [m˜ij], where m˜ij = E[C˜ij]; recall that Rv is the
dominant eigenvalue of M˜ .
To determine m˜ij it is convenient to decompose m˜ij into
m˜ij = m˜
P
ij + m˜
S
ij,
where m˜Pij is the mean number of type-j primary household cases emanating from the
primary type-i case and m˜Sij is the mean total number of primary type-j household cases
emanating from all secondary cases in the single-household epidemic.
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Network infections emamating from primary cases
Define the matrix PG of marginal global transmission probabilities, so PG = P
NR
G (recall
(3.6)) if the vaccine action is non-random and PG = P
AoN
G if the vaccine action is all-or-
nothing, where
PAoNG =
[
pAoNG (U,U) p
AoN
G (U, V )
pAoNG (V, U) p
AoN
G (V, V )
]
= pG
[
1 1− ε
1 1− ε
]
.
The marginal global transmission probabilities, for the types i, j = 1, 2, . . . , 6, are then
given by pGij = pG(A(i), A(j)), where A(k) = U if k = 3, 6 and A(k) = V if k = 1, 2, 4, 5. It
follows that
m˜Pij = µ˜
G
i pˆijp
G
ij,
where µ˜Gi is the mean number of global neighbours a typical type-i primary case has in the
forward process (i.e. ignoring the infector of this primary case) and pˆij is the probability
that a given such global neighbour is of type j. We now determine µ˜Gi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 6) and
pˆij (i, j = 1, 2, . . . , 6).
Consider a type-1 (i.e. (N,S)) primary case. Its global degree is distributed as D˜N
D
= D˜,
so µ˜G1 = µD˜−1. A given neighbour is named with probability pN , and, if that neighbour
is unnamed, it is vaccinated with probability p˜V and otherwise unvaccinated. Further,
independently, that neighbour is sampled with probability pS. Thus, pˆ11 = pNpS, pˆ12 =
(1− pN)p˜V pS, pˆ13 = (1− pN)(1− p˜V )pS, pˆ14 = pN(1− pS), pˆ15 = (1− pN)p˜V (1− pS) and
pˆ16 = (1−pN)(1− p˜V )(1−pS). The situation is similar for a type-4 (i.e. (N,Sc)) individual,
except a type-4 individual is not sampled and hence cannot name its global neighbours.
Hence µ˜G4 = µD˜−1, pˆ41 = pˆ44 = 0, pˆ42 = p˜V pS, pˆ43 = (1 − p˜V )pS, pˆ45 = p˜V (1 − pS) and
pˆ46 = (1− p˜V )(1− pS).
Next consider a type-2 (i.e. (V, S)) primary case, i∗ say. Its global degree is distributed as
D˜V , so µ˜
G
2 = µD˜V −1 and, using (4.6),
µD˜V −1 =
µD˜−1 − (1− pNpS)f ′D˜−1(1− pNpS)
p˜V
,
Let N˜S be the number of susceptible global neighbours of i
∗ that are sampled. Then
N˜S ≥ 1, since i∗ is vaccinated but not named by its global infector, and
P (N˜S = k | D˜V = d) =
(
d−1
k
)
pkS(1− pS)d−1−k(1− (1− pN)k)
1− (1− pNpS)d−1 (k = 1, 2, . . . , d− 1), (4.7)
whence, using (4.6),
µN˜S =
pS
(
µD˜−1 − (1− pN)f ′D˜−1(1− pNpS)
)
p˜V
. (4.8)
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It follows that the probability that a given susceptible neighbour of i∗ is sampled is pV˜S =
µN˜S/µ˜
G
2 and that, for j = 1, 2, . . . , 6, pˆ2j is given by pˆ1j with pS replaced by p
V˜
S . Similar
arguments for a type-5 (i.e. (U, Sc)) primary case yield µ˜G5 = µD˜V −1 and, for j = 1, 2, . . . , 6,
pˆ5j is given by pˆ4j with pS replaced by p
V˜
S .
Now consider a type-3 (i.e. (U, S)) primary case, j∗ say. Its global degree is distributed as
D˜U , so µ˜
G
3 = µD˜U−1 and, using (4.4),
µD˜U−1 =
(1− pNpS)f ′D˜−1(1− pNpS)
1− p˜V . (4.9)
Since j∗ is not vaccinated, none of its neighbours name j∗, so the probability that a given
neighbour, k∗ say, is sampled is given by
pUS = P (k
∗ sampled | k∗ does not name j∗) = pS(1− pN)
1− pSpN .
It follows that, for j = 1, 2, . . . , 6, pˆ3j is given by pˆ1j with pS replaced by p
U
S . Similarly,
µ˜G6 = µD˜U−1 and, for j = 1, 2, . . . , 6, pˆ6j is given by pˆ4j with pS replaced by p
U
S .
Network infections emamating from secondary cases
First we note that, for j = 1, 2, . . . , 6, m˜S1j = m˜
S
2j = m˜
S
4j = m˜
S
5j (= m˜V j say) and m˜
S
3j = m˜
S
6j
(= m˜SUj say). Further, for A ∈ {U, V } and j = 1, 2, . . . , 6,
m˜SAj = µS(A,U)mˆUj + µS(A, V )mˆV j,
where, for A,A′ ∈ {U, V }, µS(A,A′) is the mean number of type-A′ secondary cases in a
typical single-household epidemic initiated by a primary case of type A and, for A ∈ {U, V },
mˆAj is the mean number of type-j primary cases emanating from a typical type-A secondary
case.
Conditioning on the size of a typical globally contacted household, we obtain in an obvious
notation that
µS(A,A
′) =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜nµ
(n)
S (A,A
′) (A,A′ ∈ {U, V }).
Further, all secondary individuals in the household are vaccinated independently, each with
probability pV , so, again in an obvious notation,
µ
(n)
S (A,A
′) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pkV (1− pV )n−1−kµ(n,k)S (A,A′).
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If the vaccine action is non-random then, recalling the notation in Section 3.3, µ
(n,k)
S (A,A
′) =
µ
(n,k+δA,V )
NR (A,A
′), where δA,V = 1 if A = V and 0 otherwise. If the vaccine action is all-
or-nothing, we condition on the number of successfully vaccinated secondary individuals in
the household to obtain, for A ∈ {U, V },
µ
(n,k)
S (A, V ) =
min(k,n−2)∑
l=0
(
k
l
)
εl(1− ε)k−lµ(n−l)(λL)
(
k − l
n− l − 1
)
and
µ
(n,k)
S (A,U) =
min(k,n−2)∑
l=0
(
k
l
)
εl(1− ε)k−lµ(n−l)(λL)
(
n− k − 1
n− l − 1
)
.
(Note that µ(n−1)(λL) = 0 when k = l = n− 1.)
To determine mˆUj, note that if a secondary case, i
∗ say, is unvaccinated then its degree is
distributed according to DU and, using (4.2), its expected number of global neighbours is
µDU = (1− pSpN)f ′D(1− pSpN)/(1− pV ). (4.10)
Further, i∗ is sampled with probability pS, and the type of a given global neighbour of i∗ is
distributed according to pˆ3j if i
∗ is sampled and according to pˆ6j if i∗ is not sampled. Thus,
mˆUj = µDU
(
pS pˆ3jp
G
3j + (1− pS)pˆ6jpG6j
)
(j = 1, 2, . . . , 6).
Finally, to derive mˆV j, let NS and NSc denote the number of global neighbours of a typical
vaccinated secondary case, j∗ say, that are sampled and not sampled, respectively. Then
arguing as in the derivation of (4.8) shows that
µNS =
pS (µD − (1− pN)f ′D(1− pSpN))
pV
and
µNSc =
(1− pS) (µD − f ′D(1− pSpN))
pV
.
Further, j∗ is sampled with probability pS. If j∗ is sampled then a given neighbour is
named, vaccinated and unvaccinated with probability pN , (1−pN)p˜V and (1−pN)(1− p˜V ),
respectively; whilst if j∗ is not sampled these probabilities are 0, p˜V and 1 − p˜V . We
therefore have
mˆV j = µDV
(
pS pˆ1jp
G
1j + (1− pS)pˆ4jpG4j
)
(j = 1, 2, . . . , 6).
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4.4 Probability of a major outbreak
To determine the probability of a major outbreak we need to derive the PGFs fC˜i(s),
where s = (s1, s2, . . . , s6) ∈ [0, 1]6, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 6, and corresponding offspring PGFs
for the initial generation of the forward branching process. In the initial generation there
are two types of individual, U and V , depending on whether the initial infective in the
epidemic process is unvaccinated or vaccinated, respectively. For A ∈ {U, V }, let CA =
(CA1, CA2, . . . , CA6) denote the offspring random variable for a type-A initial individual in
the forward branching process and let fCA(s) = E[s
CA ] denote the PGF of CA.
Recall that secondary individuals in a household are vaccinated independently, each with
probability pV . Thus, conditioning first on household size and then on the number of
secondary members that are vaccinated yields, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 6,
fC˜i(s) =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜n
n−1∑
vs=0
(
n− 1
vs
)
pvsV (1− pV )n−1−vsfC˜(n,vs)i (s),
where C˜
(n,vs)
i is the offspring random variable for a type-i non-initial individual, given
that the corresponding household is of size n and has vs secondary members vaccinated.
Similarly, and in an obvious notation, for A ∈ {U, V },
fCA(s) =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜n
n−1∑
vs=0
(
n− 1
vs
)
pvsV (1− pV )n−1−vsfC(n,vs)A (s).
With an all-or-nothing vaccine action, we may condition also on the number of vaccinations
of secondary members that are unsuccessful to obtain, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 6,
f
C˜
(n,vs)
i
(s) =
vs∑
us=0
(
vs
us
)
(1− ε)usεvs−usf
Cˆ
(n−vs+us,us)
i
(s),
where Cˆ
(n′,v′)
i is the offspring random variable for a type-i non-initial individual, given that
the corresponding household contains n′−1 other susceptibles, of which v′ are unsuccessfully
vaccinated. (Note that, unlike with households based vaccination, the vaccine status of
these susceptibles is important as it affects their degree distributions.) Similarly, and in an
obvious notation, for A ∈ {U, V },
f
C
(n,vs)
A
(s) =
vs∑
us=0
(
vs
us
)
(1− ε)usεvs−usf
Cˆ
(n−vs+us,us)
A
(s).
Calculation of f
C˜
(n,vs)
i
(s) and f
C
(n,vs)
A
(s) when the vaccine action is non-random and of
f
Cˆ
(n′,v′)
i
(s) and f
Cˆ
(n′,v′)
A
(s) when the vaccine action is all-or-nothing is described in Ap-
pendix A.5. As with previous calculations, these simplify appreciably if the infectious
period is constant.
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In either case we approximate the probability of a major outbreak, with a single initial
infective being of type A ∈ {U, V }, as p(A)maj = 1− fCA(σ), where σ = (σi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 6) is
the unique solution of fC˜i(σ) = σi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 6) in [0, 1)
6. (This assumes of course that
Rv > 1. If Rv ≤ 1 then p(V )maj = p(U)maj = 0.) The probability of a major outbreak with an
initial infective chosen uniformly from the whole population is therefore
pmaj =
{
pV p
V
maj + (1− pV )pUmaj, non-random vaccine,
pV (1− ε)pVmaj + (1− pV )pUmaj, all-or-nothing vaccine.
(With an all-or-nothing vaccine, if the initial infective is vaccinated then a major outbreak
can occur only if that vaccination is unsuccessful, which occurs with probability 1− ε.)
4.5 Final outcome of major outbreak
We approximate the susceptibility set of a given individual, i∗ say, by a households-based
(backward) multitype branching process, where, as in Section 3.3, the type of a household
is given by the type of the primary member of the corresponding local susceptibility set.
In the initial generation there are two types, V and U , depending on whether or not i∗ is
vaccinated. In subsequent generations, there are 6 types, numbered 1–6 as in Section 4.2,
where now N means that the primary case was named by the individual that it contacts
globally to join i∗’s susceptibility set. Similar to before, secondary members of a local
susceptibility set need only to be typed V or U . Let BU = (BU1, BU2, . . . , BU6) and
BV = (BV 1, BV 2, . . . , BV 6) denote the offspring random variables for the initial generation
of this branching process, and let B˜i = (B˜i1, B˜i2, . . . , B˜i6) (i = 1, 2, . . . , 6) be the offspring
random variables for all subsequent generations.
We determine first the PGF fB˜i(s), where s = (s1, s2, . . . , s6) ∈ [0, 1]6. Let M i =
(MiU ,MiV ), where MiU and MiV are respectively the number of unvaccinated and vac-
cinated secondary individuals in the local susceptibility set of a typical type-i primary
individual. Then B˜i admits the decomposition
B˜i = Bˆ
P
i +
MiU∑
k=1
Bˆ
S
U(k) +
MiV∑
l=1
Bˆ
S
V (l), (4.11)
where Bˆ
P
i , Bˆ
S
U(k) and Bˆ
S
V (l) are the respective contributions to B˜i from the primary
individual, the kth unvaccinated secondary individual and the lth vaccinated secondary
individual in the local susceptibility set. The random variables being summed on the right
hand side of (4.11) are mutually independent and independent of M i, so, in an obvious
notation,
fB˜i(s) = fBPi (s)fM i(fBˆSU
(s), f
Bˆ
S
V
(s)). (4.12)
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To derive the PGF fM i , note that fM1 = fM2 = fM4 = fM5 (= fMV say) and fM3 = fM6
(= fMU say). Further, conditioning on the size of the household and noting that secondary
individuals in the household are vaccinated independently, each with probability pV , yields
fMA(s) =
∞∑
n=1
ρ˜n
n−1∑
v=0
(
n− 1
v
)
pvV (1− pV )n−1−vfM (n,v+δA,V )A (s) (s ∈ [0, 1]
2)
for A ∈ {U, V }, where M (n,v)A is as in Section 3.3. Calculation of fM (n,v)A (s) for the two
models of vaccine action is described in Appendix A.6.
We determine next the PGFs f
Bˆ
P
i
(i = 1, 2, . . . , 6). For i = 1, 2, . . . , 6, let D˜(i) denote the
degree of a typical type-i primary individual, who thus has D˜(i) − 1 global neighbours in
the construction of the backward process, and let X˜ i = (X˜i1, X˜i2, . . . , X˜i6), where X˜ij is
the number of those D˜(i)− 1 global neighbours that are of type j, so ∑6j=1 X˜ij = D˜(i)− 1.
To determine the PGF f
Bˆ
P
i
we first condition on X˜ i and then consider how many of the
X˜ i individuals of the various types actually join the susceptibility set. For i = 1, 3, 4 and
6, the types of these D˜(i) − 1 global neighbours are chosen independently, according to
(pˆij, j = 1, 2, . . . , 6), so
fX˜i(s) = fD˜(i)−1(gˆi(s)) (i = 1, 3, 4, 6),
where gˆi(s) =
∑6
j=1 pˆijsj. Further D˜(1)
D
= D˜(4) ∼ D˜ and D˜(3) D= D˜(6) ∼ D˜U (see (4.4)),
where
D
= denotes equality in distribution.
Now consider a typical type-2 primary individual and let N˜S and N˜Sc be the number of its
D˜(2)−1 global neighbours in the construction of the backward process that are sampled and
unsampled, respectively, so N˜S + N˜Sc = D˜(2)− 1. Now each of these D˜(2)− 1 neighbours
independently is named with probability pN and, if it is not named, it is vaccinated with
probability p˜V , so
fX˜2(s) = EN˜S ,N˜Sc
[
(gˆ21(s))
N˜S(gˆ22(s))
N˜Sc
]
,
where gˆ21(s) = pNs1+(1−pN)p˜V s2+(1−pN)(1− p˜V )s3 and gˆ22(s) = pNs4+(1−pN)p˜V s5+
(1− pN)(1− p˜V )s6. Further, D˜(2) ∼ D˜V , hence using (4.6) and (4.7), we obtain
fX˜2(s) = p˜
−1
V
[
fD˜−1 (gˆ2(s, 0))− fD˜−1 (gˆ2(s, pN))
]
, (4.13)
where gˆ2(s, x) = pS(1− x)gˆ21(s) + (1− pS)gˆ22(s). A similar argument shows that
fX˜5(s) = p˜
−1
V
[
fD˜−1 (gˆ5(s, 0))− fD˜−1 (gˆ5(s, pN))
]
, (4.14)
where gˆ5(s, x) = pS(1 − x)gˆ51(s) + (1 − pS)gˆ52(s), with gˆ51(s) = p˜V s2 + (1 − p˜V )s3 and
gˆ52(s) = p˜V s5 + (1− p˜V )s6.
Consider a typical type-i primary individual. Each of its D˜(i)− 1 global neighbours in the
construction of the backward process enters the susceptibility set independently and with
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probability pBij, where j is the type of the global neighbour. Here p
B
ij is the probability that
a type-j neighbour of a type-i individual joins the susceptibility set. It follows that
pBij =
{
pGji non-random vaccine,
pGij all-or-nothing vaccine.
(The different formulae arise from the fact that in the all-or-nothing case, in addition to
requiring a contact from the neighbour to the type-i individual of interest, a vaccinated
neighbour is able to join the susceptibility set only if its vaccination fails.) Hence, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , 6,
f
Bˆ
P
i
(s) = fX˜i(h
B
i (s)),
where hBi (s) = (h
B
i1(s1), h
B
i2(s2), . . . , h
B
i6(s6)), with h
B
ij(s) = 1− pGij + spGij (j = 1, 2, . . . , 6).
We determine now the PGFs f
Bˆ
S
U
and f
Bˆ
S
V
. In an obvious notation,
f
Bˆ
S
A
(s) = fXA(h
B
A(s)) (A ∈ {U, V }),
where hBU = h
B
3 and h
B
V = h
B
1 . A typical type-U secondary individual, j
∗
U say, has degree
distributed according to DU (recall (4.2)) and, since j
∗
U enters the susceptibility set process
through a local susceptibility set, all of j∗U ’s global neighbours are available to join the
susceptibility set. Further, j∗U is sampled with probability pS, in which case, apart from its
degree, j∗U behaves similarly to a type-3 primary individual, otherwise j
∗
U is not sampled
and behaves similarly to a type-6 primary individual. Thus,
fXU (s) = pSfDU (gˆ3(s)) + (1− pS)fDU (gˆ6(s)).
A typical type-V secondary individual, j∗V say, is also sampled with probability pS, and
a similar argument, using appropriate modifications of (4.13) and (4.14) as j∗V has degree
distributed according to DV , yields
fXV (s) = p
−1
V {pS [fD (gˆ2(s, 0))− fD (gˆ2(s, pN))]
+ (1− pS) [fD (gˆ5(s, 0))− fD (gˆ5(s, pN))]} .
Finally, we determine the offspring PGFs for the initial generation, fBU and fBV . Observe
that, for A ∈ {U, V }, in the initial generation, a primary individual of type A behaves
according to the same probability law as a typical secondary type-A individual (in any
generation), so (4.12) becomes
fBA(s) = fBˆSA
(s)fMA
(
f
Bˆ
S
U
(s), f
Bˆ
S
V
(s)
)
(A ∈ {U, V })
and fBA(s) can be evaluated using results given above.
Suppose that 0 < pV < 1, pG(U, V )pG(V, U) 6= 0 and Rv > 1. Let ξ˜ = (ξ˜1, ξ˜2, . . . , ξ˜6) be the
unique solution in [0, 1)6 of the equations fB˜i(s) = si (i = 1, 2, . . . , 6). Then the proportions
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of unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals that are infected by a major epidemic are given
by zU = 1 − fBU (ξ˜) and zV = 1 − fBV (ξ˜), respectively. The overall proportion of the
population infected by a major outbreak is therefore
z =
{
pV z
V + (1− pV )zU , non-random vaccine,
pV (1− ε)zV + (1− pV )zU , all-or-nothing vaccine.
5 Model behaviour/exploration
In this section we explore the behaviour of the model and its dependence on some key
parameters. The main focus is on numerical comparison of the various vaccine allocation
regimes for a variety of household size and network degree distributions. First, however,
we comment briefly on the relationship between outcomes in simulated finite populations
and our asymptotic analytical results, and also give some discussion of the choice of the
parameters pS and pN in acquaintance vaccination.
5.1 Outcomes in finite populations
One can compare the analytical, asymptotic, quantities of interest (pmaj and z) to simulation-
based estimates of the corresponding quantities on finite populations. As in Ball et al. (2009,
Section 5), we find that the agreement becomes reasonable with the number of households
m in the low hundreds and very close indeed for m over about 1000, though the convergence
is a little slower for heavier tailed degree distributions.
5.2 Acquaintance vaccination dependence on pS and pN
The vaccine coverage c = pV = 1− fD(1− pSpN) in our acquaintance vaccination model is
determined by the product pSpN (see equation (4.1)). Here we investigate the dependence
of the model outcomes (Rv, pmaj and z) on the precise values of pN and pS, for a fixed
coverage. First we consider a perfect vaccine, in which case analytical progress is possible.
The argument below follows much the same lines as the corresponding argument for the
standard network model (Ball & Sirl, 2013).
Since the vaccine is perfect, we have only households of types 3 and 6 (i.e. (U, S) and
(U, Sc)); and since these two types are sampled independently with the same probability,
both the backward and forward processes reduce to single-type. The mean number of
forward neighbours of an infected individual is µD˜U−1+µS(U,U)µDU , where µS(U,U) is (as
in earlier sections) the mean number of unvaccinated secondary cases in a single-household
epidemic initiated by an unvaccinated primary case. Each infected individual is sampled
with probability pUS , so fails to name each forward neighbour with probability p
U
S (1−pN)+
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1−pUS . Then each such unnamed individual avoids vaccination (by other neighbours in the
network) with probability 1− p˜V . Thus
Rv = (µD˜U−1 + µDUµS(U,U))(p
U
S (1− pN) + 1− pUS )(1− p˜V )pG.
Now writing p′ = pSpN for the part of (pS, pN) which specifies the coverage, and us-
ing (4.5), (4.9) and (4.10), this can be written as
Rv = fD˜−1(1− p′)pG
(
f ′
D˜−1(1− p′)
fD˜−1(1− p′)
+ µS(U,U)
f ′D(1− p′)
fD(1− p′)
)
(1− 2p′ + p′pN)
= η(p′)(1− 2p′ + p′pN),
where the function η depends on pS and pN only through their product p
′. It is immediate
that Rv is increasing in pN for fixed p
′ = pSpN . Thus we have that the best effect is achieved
by taking (pS, pN) = (1, p
′) and the worst with (pS, pN) = (p′, 1); with Rbv = η(p
′)(1− p′)2
and Rwv = η(p
′)(1−p′), i.e. Rbv = (1−p′)Rwv . Precisely as in the network-only model without
households, we note that this difference is generally quite small and is at its largest when p′
is large, so there is high coverage and the epidemic is likely to be subcritical in any event.
When the vaccine action is not perfect we cannot make analytical progress in this direction,
but extensive numerical calculations suggest that Rv, pmaj and z are usually monotonic in
pN when pSpN is fixed and that in any case the difference in outcomes between the best
and worst choices are very small. We do not explicitly demonstrate this here, but we note
that this is the same as found in Ball and Sirl (2013) for the model without households and
can be seen to some extent in all of the plots in Section 5.3, where the two acquaintance
vaccination plots are barely distinguishable in most cases.
In the further numerical studies below we use the terms ‘best’ and ‘worst’ to refer to the
acquaintance vaccination schemes with (pS, pN) = (1, p
′) and (pS, pN) = (p′, 1) even though
the names are not necessarily correct. As noted above, the precise choice of pS and pN
seems to have only a very weak influence on the final outcome of the epidemic model and
these two cases seem to give bounds for the quantities of interest.
5.3 Effect of different vaccine allocation regimes
We now explore the relative effectiveness of the different vaccine allocation regimes dis-
cussed in this paper, across a small but representative variety of household size and degree
distributions. In the following figures we plot an outcome (Rv or z) against the vaccine
coverage c for several vaccine allocation strategies; with all other parameters held fixed.
Using different plots within the same figure we vary some of these other parameters. The
vaccine allocation methods we consider are (i) uniformly chosen individuals (Ind UAR), (ii)
uniformly chosen households (HH UAR), (iii & iv) best and worst household-based alloca-
tion (HH Best and HH Worst), (v & vi) ‘best’ and ‘worst’ acquaintance vaccination (Acq
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Best and Acq Worst); see the end of Section 3.1 for descriptions of the household-based
vaccination schemes.
In this numerical section we use household size distributions ρUK = (31, 32, 16, 14, 5, 2)/100
and ρPak = (9, 45, 77, 118, 141, 146, 123, 104, 237)/1000, which have respective means 2.4
and 6.8, as realistic household size distributions from the UK (Office for National Statistics
[UK], 2011, Table 3.1) and Pakistan (National Institute of Population Studies [Pakistan]
and ICF International, 2013, Table 2.9), respectively. The degree distributions we use are
the standard Poisson distribution and a power law distribution with exponential cutoff (as
in, for example, Amaral, Scala, Barthe´le´my and Stanley (2000)). For this latter distribution
we use the notation D ∼ PowC(a, κ) to denote that pk = k−ae−k/κ (k = 1, 2, . . . ), i.e. a
power law with index a and exponential cutoff at about κ. In particular, we use the degree
distribution D ∼ PowC(2, 120), which has mean µD ≈ 3.001 and σ2D ≈ 66. We also use
the notation Gam(k, r) to denote a Gamma distribution with shape parameter k and scale
parameter r (and thus mean kr and variance kr2).
First we look at the relative effectiveness of the various allocation schemes, and how this
changes with the household size distribution and the network degree distribution. Figure 1
shows plots of the post-vaccination threshold parameter Rv as a function of the vaccine
coverage c for the 6 vaccine allocation schemes with a perfect vaccine. The different plots
use different combinations of household size and network degree distribution, with all other
parameters kept fixed (full details are in the figure caption). Firstly we note that the
patterns of the household-based allocation schemes are consistent with those of Ball and
Lyne (2006, Section 4) for the standard households model. We see that when the network
degree distribution is not very variable (Poisson) good household-based schemes perform
similarly to acquaintance vaccination. On the other hand, when the network degree dis-
tribution is much more variable (cut-off power law) we see that acquaintance vaccination
significantly outperforms the household-based schemes; though to a slightly lesser extent
when the household size distribution is also more variable.
Figures 2 and 3 are similar to Figure 1, but we consider imperfect vaccine action models
(with the same efficacy 1−E[AB] = 0.7) and we plot both the post-vaccination threshold
parameter Rv and expected final size of a large outbreak z. In Figure 2 we use an all-or-
nothing vaccine action model with success probability ε = 0.7 and consider two network
degree distributions, with fixed (less variable) household size distribution. In Figure 3 we
use a non-random vaccine action model with relative susceptibility and infectivity a = 0.5
and b = 0.6, respectively, and vary the household size distibution, with a fixed (more
variable) network degree distribution. Note that for this choice of a and b, determining the
‘best’ and ‘worst’ household-based vaccine allocation schemes are not linear programming
problems (see Section 3.4). In our numerical routine we use the MATLAB constrained
optimisation solver fmincon.
We see in the upper plots (of Rv) in Figures 2 and 3 broadly similar patterns to those in
Figure 1. The lower plots in Figure 2 show the ordering of z for the different allocation
regimes being the same as the ordering of Rv. These two lower plots look qualitatively
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Figure 1: Plots of Rv versus coverage (c) for various kinds of allocation of a perfect vaccine.
We use two different household size distributions: upper plots ρ = ρUK, lower plots ρ = ρPak;
and two different degree distributions: left plots D ∼ Poi(5), right plots D ∼ PowC(2, 120).
Other parameters are I ∼ Gam(5, 1/5), λL = 1, λG = 0.3.
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Figure 2: Plots of Rv and z versus coverage (c) for various kinds of allocation of an all-or-
nothing vaccine with success probability ε = 0.7. We use two different degree distributions:
left plots D ∼ Poi(5), right plots D ∼ PowC(2, 120). Other parameters are ρ = ρUK,
I ∼ Gam(5, 1/5), λL = 1, λG = 0.2.
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Figure 3: Plots of Rv and z versus coverage (c) for various kinds of allocation of a non-
random vaccine with relative susceptibility and infectivity a = 0.5 and b = 0.6 respectively.
We use two different household size distributions: left plots ρ = ρUK, right plots ρ = ρPak.
Other parameters are D ∼ PowC(2, 120), I ∼ Gam(5, 1/5), λL = 1, λG = 0.2.
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quite different, but it is important to note that in one the vaccine can and in the other the
vaccine cannot bring the epidemic below threshold. These plots suggest that, as might be
expected, when the network degree distribution is not so variable (e.g. the Poisson case)
then vaccine allocation should be focussed on households-based methods, whilst when the
network degree distribution is more variable (e.g. the cutoff power law) then targeting
vaccination effort based on the network might give better results. Precisely which method
is preferable will of course depend heavily on the other parameters of the model, but we
have demonstrated that either allocation method, household-based or acquaintance-based,
can be preferable to the other.
The lower plots of Figure 3 follow similar patterns in that we are considering the case of
a quite variable network degree distribution so acquaintance vaccination outperforms the
household-based methods. There are however some unexpected patterns in the lower-right
plot of Figure 3, in that the ordering of the various household-based allocation regimes
are not the same as in the corresponding plot of Rv immediately above it. In particular,
for lower coverages the ‘worst’ households based allocation outperforms the ‘best’ ! This
demonstrates that when the epidemic is well above threshold, optimising vaccine alloca-
tion based on R∗ does not necessarily result in an expected final size that is as low as
possible; cf. Keeling and Ross (2015), who observe a similar phenomenon in the standard
households model with a perfect vaccine. The threshold parameter Rv measures household-
to-household transmission, but does not directly take into account the size of the within-
household outbreaks. This could perhaps be resolved by optimising an individual-based
threshold parameter instead (see Pellis, Ball and Trapman (2012); Ball, Pellis and Trap-
man (2016)), but the optimisation problem would be more difficult than the one we have
considered. We also note that this phenomenon appears to arise only when the epidemic
is well above criticality.
Lastly we note here that the behaviour of pmaj is broadly similar to that of z. We do
not present any plots here, but they have shapes and patterns similar to those in the z
plots that are shown, including the unexpected ordering observed in the lower-right plot of
Figure 3.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed vaccine allocation strategies in stochasitc SIR epidemic
models upon populations with household and random network (of the configuration model
type) structure. By exploiting branching process approximations we derive asymptotic
results describing the threshold behaviour of this epidemic model when there are few initial
infectives and the final outcome in the event of a major outbreak. Particular attention has
been paid to the analysis of acquaintance vaccination, which aims to target vaccination
at individuals who are more highly connected in the network. We find that acquaintance
vaccination potentially offers substantial benefits over other (households-based) vaccine
allocation regimes.
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Whilst we have shown that acquaintance vaccination is potentially useful, it is clearly not
feasible to implement in practice in human populations, so investigation of a more ethically
acceptable allocation regime that preserves the targeting of well-connected individuals is
a clear direction for future work. It is also likely that the effectiveness of acquaintance
vaccination will depend on the amount of clustering in the network in an interesting way;
we have touched on this through the use of different household size distributions, but clearly
there is scope for considerably more work in this direction. Further issues that warrant more
investigation include comparison to optimal configuration model based vaccine allocation,
assuming knowledge of the degree of every individual in the network (see Ball and Sirl (2012,
Section 5 and Appendix B)), the determination of good/optimal vaccination strategies
based on household and network information and extending acquaintance vaccination to
include the possiblity of naming individuals who are in the same household.
A particularly striking feature of the numerical study which clearly warrants further inves-
tigation is the fact that, when vaccine coverage is insufficient to prevent a major outbreak,
the ordering of the performance of the household-based allocation strategies can be different
depending on whether Rv or z is used as the measure of performance.
We also note in closing that there are some numerical challenges involved in implement-
ing the methods we have presented. These are particularly relevant for the calculations
relating to the forward process (i.e. calculation of pmaj), but do also apply to the back-
ward process (calculation of z). The main issue that arises is that of slowly converging
infinite sums and the resulting possibilities for numerical overflow and underflow. Writ-
ing doubly or triply-infinite sums as one infinite and one or two finite sums (for example∑∞
i=0
∑∞
j=0 ai,j =
∑∞
k=0
∑k
l=0 ak−l,l) helps in some regards (e.g. faster computing since there
is only one truncation to have to control the error of) but hinders in others (e.g. slower
computing since methods to avoid underflow and overflow errors become more involved).
Also, the case pSpN = 0 can present division by zero issues if not considered carefully.
A APPENDIX
A.1 Notation
The following notation is used throughout the appendix. The symbols Z+ and R+ denote
the non-negative integers and reals, respectively. For vectors x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) and
y = (y1, y2, . . . , ym) in Rm, we define xy =
∏m
i=1 xiyi and x
y =
∏m
i=1 x
yi
i . We write x ≤ y
if xi ≤ yi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) and x < y if, in addition, xi < yi for at least one i. For
n, k ∈ Z+, the falling factorial n!/(n − k)! is denoted by n[k]. For n,k ∈ Zm+ , we define
n[k] =
∏m
i=1 ni[ki]. For i, j ∈ Zm+ , we write
∑j
k=i for
∑j1
k1=i1
∑j2
k2=i2
. . .
∑jm
km=im
. Finally, we
let f (r) denote the r-th order derivative of the function f .
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A.2 Multitype single-household epidemic and key result
Consider a single-household SIR epidemic model with m types of individuals, labelled
1, 2, . . . ,m. Suppose that, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, there are initially ai infectives and ni suscep-
tibles of type i, and let a = (a1, a2, . . . , am) and n = (n1, n2, . . . , nm). For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
the infectious periods of type-i infectives are each distributed according to a random vari-
able I(i). For i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, the individual-to-individual infection rate from a given
type-i infective to a given type-j susceptible is λij. As in Section 2.1, such infections
are governed by Poisson processes, and all Poisson processes and infectious periods are
mutually independent.
To each infective we attach a vector of p non-negative integer-valued random attributes
distributed according to a vector random variable A(i) = (A
(i)
1 , A
(i)
2 , . . . , A
(i)
p ), where i
denotes the type of the infective. In our applicationsA(i) will describe the numbers of global
infections of different types of individuals made by an infective in the single-household
epidemic. The realisations of the random variables (I(i),A(i)) are independent for distinct
infectives and identically distributed for infectives of the same type. Note that I(i) and
A(i) may be dependent. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, let Ti be the number of initial susceptibles
of type i that are ultimately infected by the epidemic and let A(i)(Ti) be the sum of the
attribute vectors over all ai+Ti infectives of type i. Further, let T = (T1, T2, . . . , Tm) and let
A(T ) =
∑m
i=1A
(i)(Ti) be the sum of the attribute vectors over all
∑m
i=1(ai + Ti) infectives
in the epidemic. Thus, in applications, A(T ) will give the offspring random variable for the
forward branching process. For x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm and s = (s1, s2, . . . , sp) ∈ [0, 1]p,
let
φ(x, s) = E[xn−TsA(T )].
We give below an expression for φ(x, s) in terms of multivariate Gontcharoff polynomials,
first studied by Lefe`vre and Picard (1990), which we now define. Let U = (uj ∈ Rm : j ∈
Zm+ ) be a collection of real numbers. The Gontcharoff polynomials associated with U ,
denoted (Gk(x|U), k ∈ Zm+ ,x ∈ Rm), are defined recursively by
k∑
j=0
k[j]u
k−j
j Gj(x|U) = xk (k ≥ 0). (A.1)
Note that G0(x|U) ≡ 1 and that Gk(x|U) is a polynomial of degree k1, k2, . . . , km in
x1, x2, . . . , xm, respectively, depending only on (uj : j < k). The following result is derived
easily from Ball and O’Neill (1999, Theorem 5.1), so its proof is omitted.
Theorem 1. For x ∈ Rm and s ∈ [0, 1]p,
φ(x, s) =
n∑
j=0
n[j](ψ(s, j))
n+a−jGj(x|U), (A.2)
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where ψ(s, j) = (ψ1(s, j), ψ2(s, j), . . . , ψm(s, j)), with
ψi(s, j) = E
[
exp
(
−I(i)
m∑
k=1
λikjk
)
sA
(i)
]
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m),
and U = (uj : j ∈ Zm+ ) has components uj = ψ(s, j).
We now describe how Theorem 1 can be used to determine offspring PGFs for the forward
branching processes in the main body of the paper. Recall that primary and secondary
infectives in a household typically have distinct global degree distributions. Hence, in
addition to being typed according to their vaccination status, individuals also need to
be typed as primary or secondary. Thus we may write m = mP + mS, where types
1, 2, . . . ,mP correspond to primary individuals and types mP + 1,mP + 2, . . . ,m to sec-
ondary individuals. Write a = (aP ,aS), n = (nP ,nS), x = (xP ,xS), T = (T P ,T S) and
ψ(s, j) = (ψP (s, j),ψS(s, j)) in the obvious fashion. Note that all susceptibles are sec-
ondary individuals, so nP = 0, and all initial infectives are primary individuals, so aS = 0.
It follows that T P = 0 and the index j of the summation in (A.2) takes the form (0, jS).
Let
φ˜(xS, s) = E[x
nS−TS
S s
A(T )] (xS ∈ RmS , s ∈ [0, 1]p).
Then the following corollary follows easily from Theorem 1. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, let λ
(i)
S =
(λi,mP+1, λi,mP+2, . . . , λi,m)
>, where > denotes transpose.
Corollary 2. For xS ∈ RmS and s ∈ [0, 1]p,
φ˜(xS, s) =
nS∑
jS=0
nS[jS ](ψ˜P (s, jS))
aP (ψ˜S(s, jS))
nS−jS GjS(xS|US), (A.3)
where ψ˜P (s, jS) =
(
ψ˜1(s, jS), ψ˜2(s, jS), . . . , ψ˜mP (s, jS)
)
and ψ˜S(s, jS) =
(
ψ˜mP+1(s, jS), ψ˜mP+2(s, jS), . . . , ψ˜m(s, jS)
)
, with
ψ˜i(s, jS) = E
[
exp(−I(i)jSλ(i)S )sA
(i)
]
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) (A.4)
and US = (u
S
jS
: jS ∈ ZmS+ ) has components uSjS = ψ˜S(s, jS).
We are primarily concerned with determining the PGF of A(T ), which of course is obtained
by setting xS = 1 in (A.3). Thus, all that remains is to determine ψ˜i(s, jS), which is
application dependent. Note from (A.4) that it is sufficient to determine, for θ ∈ R+ and
s ∈ [0, 1]p,
ψˆi(θ, s) = E
[
exp(−θI(i))sA(i)
]
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,m),
which we now do for the various models in the paper.
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A.3 No vaccination
This model is studied in Ball et al. (2010), so we just state the result. Note that there
are two types of individual, primary (P ) and secondary (S), with global forward degrees
distributed according to DP ∼ D˜ − 1 and DS ∼ D, respectively. Further p = 1, so s is
a scalar, s say. For a degree distribution D and real numbers c1, c2, θ, define the function
F (D, c1, c2, θ) by
F (D, c1, c2, θ) =
∞∑
r=0
cr1
r!
φI(θ + rλG)f
(r)
D (c2). (A.5)
Then, for A ∈ {P, S},
ψˆA(θ, s) = F (DA, 1− s, s, θ),
cf. Ball et al. (2010, Theorem 1). Equation (A.5), in conjunction with Corollary 2, enables
the PGFs fC(n) and fC˜(n) , defined in Section 2.2.1, to be evaluated.
A.4 Households based vaccination
Recall from Section 3 that with an all-or-nothing vaccine action all required PGFs and
means can be expressed in terms of fC(n) , fC˜(n) and µn(λL), so here we need consider
only the non-random vaccine action model. This model has four types of individuals:
primary-unvaccinated (PU), primary-vaccinated (PV ), secondary-unvaccinated (SU) and
secondary-vaccinated (SV ). Denote their respective forward global degree distributions by
DPU , DPV , DSU and DSV , respectively, and recall from Section 3.3 that DPU
D
= DPV ∼
D˜− 1 and DSU D= DSV ∼ D. For F ∈ {PU, PV, SU, SV }, the random attribute of interest
is A(F ) = (A
(F )
U , A
(F )
V ), where A
(F )
U and A
(F )
V are the number of unvaccinated and vaccinated
global infections made by a type-F infective in the single household epidemic. Thus mS = 2
and we determine ψˆF (θ, s), where s = (sU , sV ).
Consider first ψˆSU(θ, s). Conditioning on the degree DSU and infectious period I of a
typical type-SU infective, i∗ say, yields
ψˆSU(θ, s) = EDSU ,I
[
e−θIE
[
sA
(SU) | DSU , I
]]
. (A.6)
Let NV denote the number of i
∗’s global neighbours that are vaccinated. Then(
A
(SU)
U | NV , DSU , I
)
∼ Bin (DSU −NV , 1− e−λGI) and(
A
(SU)
V | NV , DSU , I
)
∼ Bin (NV , 1− e−λGaI) independently, so
E
[
sA
(SU) | NV , DSU , I
]
=
(
e−λGI + (1− e−λGI)sU
)DSU−NV (e−λGaI + (1− e−λGaI)sV )NV ,
(A.7)
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whence, since (NV | DSU) ∼ Bin(DSU , pV ),
E
[
sA
(SU) | DSU , I
]
=
(
(1− pV )
[
e−λGI + (1− e−λGI)sU
]
+ pV
[
e−λGaI + (1− e−λGaI)sV
])DSU .
(A.8)
(As usual, Bin(n, p) denotes a binomial distribution with parameters n ∈ Z+ and p ∈ [0, 1].)
Let aˆ(s) = pV sV + (1− pV )sU , bˆ(s) = pV (1− sV ) and cˆ(s) = (1− pV )(1− sU). Then, using
(A.6) and (A.8),
ψˆSU(θ, s) = EDSU ,I
[
e−θI
(
aˆ(s) + bˆ(s)e−λGaI + cˆ(s)e−λGI
)DSU]
=
∞∑
k=0
P (DSU = k)EI
[
e−θI
k∑
r=0
k−r∑
l=0
k!
r!l!(k − r − l)!(aˆ(s))
k−l−r
× (bˆ(s)e−λGaI)r(cˆ(s)e−λGI)l
]
=
∞∑
r=0
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
k=r+l
P (DSU = k)
k!
r!l!(k − r − l)!(aˆ(s))
k−l−r
× (bˆ(s))r(cˆ(s))lE [e−(θ+(ar+l)λG)I] . (A.9)
For a degree distribution D and real numbers c1, c2, c3, θ, a, b, define the function
G(D, c1, c2, c3, θ, a, b) by
G(D, c1, c2, c3, θ, a, b) =
∞∑
r=0
∞∑
l=0
cr2
r!
cl3
l!
φI(θ + λGb(ar + l))f
(r+l)
D (c1). (A.10)
Then (A.9) implies that
ψˆSU(θ, s) = G(DSU , aˆ(s), bˆ(s), cˆ(s), θ, a, 1). (A.11)
A similar argument shows that
ψˆSV (θ, s) = G(DSV , aˆ(s), bˆ(s), cˆ(s), θ, a, b), (A.12)
and that ψˆPU(θ, s) is given by (A.11), with DSU replaced by DPU , and ψˆPV (θ, s) is given
by (A.12), with DSV replaced by DPV .
If a closed-form expression for fD is available then G(D, c1, c2, c3, θ, a, b) may be computed
by using a finite truncation of (A.10). If a closed-form expression for fD is unavailable then
G(D, c1, c2, c3, θ, a, b) may be computed by using a finite truncation of a corresponding
triple sum (cf. (A.9)).
Note that if the infectious period is constant, say I ≡ ι, then (A.6) to (A.8) imply that
ψˆSU(θ, s) = e
−θιfDSU
(
aˆ(s) + e−λGaιbˆ(s) + e−λGιcˆ(s)
)
and corresponding expressions for ψˆSV (θ, s), ψˆPU(θ, s) and ψˆPV (θ, s) are easily derived.
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A.5 Acquaintance vaccination
This model has eight types of individuals, six primary and two secondary, which, as in
Section 4.2, we label 1, 2, . . . , 6 and U, V , respectively. For each type i, the random attribute
of interest A(i) = (A
(i)
1 , A
(i)
2 , . . . , A
(i)
6 ), where A
(i)
j is the number of global infections of
a type j individual made by an infective type i individual. Thus we determine, in an
obvious notation, ψˆi(θ, s) (i = 1, 2, . . . , 6), ψˆU(θ, s) and ψˆV (θ, s); for θ ∈ R+ and s =
(s1, s2, . . . , s6) ∈ [0, 1]6. It is convenient to treat the all-or-nothing and non-random vaccine
action models separately.
A.5.1 All-or-nothing vaccine action
For i = 1, 2, . . . , 6, recall that D˜(i) is the global degree of a typical type-i primary individual,
i∗ say, and let X˜ i = (X˜i1, X˜i2, . . . , X˜i6), where X˜ij is the number of i
∗’s forward global
neighbours that have type i. (We use the same notation as for the backward process in
Section 4.5, since the distribution of (D˜(i), X˜ i) is the same for the forward and backward
processes.) Recall that types 3 and 6 have not been vaccinated and types 1, 2, 4 and 5
have been vaccinated. Thus(
A
(i)
j |X˜ij, I
)
∼
 Bin
(
X˜ij, 1− e−λGI
)
if j = 3, 6,
Bin
(
X˜ij, (1− ε)(1− e−λGI)
)
if j = 1, 2, 4, 5,
and
E
[
sA
(i) |X˜ i, I
]
=
∏
j=3,6
(
e−λGI + (1− e−λGI)sj
)X˜ij
×
∏
j=1,2,4,5
(
ε+ (1− ε)e−λGI + (1− ε)(1− e−λGI)sj
)X˜ij
. (A.13)
Further, for i = 1, 3, 4, 6, the types of the D˜(i) − 1 of i∗’s forward global neighbours are
chosen independently according to pˆij, defined in Section 4.3, so
E
[
sA
(i) |D˜(i), I
]
=
(
pˆi(s, ε) + (1− pˆi(s, ε))e−λGI
)D˜(i)−1
, (A.14)
where
pˆi(s, ε) =
∑
j=3,6
pˆijsj +
∑
j=1,2,4,5
pˆij(ε+ (1− ε)sj).
Hence,
ψˆi(θ, s) = E
[
e−θIsA
(i)
]
= EI
[
e−θIED˜(i)
[
E
[
sA
(i)|D˜(i), I
]]]
= EI
[
e−θIED˜(i)
[
(pˆi(s, ε) + (1− pˆi(s, ε))e−λGI)D˜(i)−1
]]
. (A.15)
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A similar argument to the derivation of (A.9), using the binomial theorem rather than the
multinomial theorem, then yields
ψˆi(θ, s) = F (D˜(i)− 1, 1− pˆi(s, ε), pˆi(s, ε), θ).
For i = 2 and i = 5, (A.13) still holds but fX˜i(s) is given by (4.13) and (4.14), respectively.
Omitting the details, similar arguments to the above show that, for i = 2, 5,
ψˆi(θ, s) = p˜
−1
V
[
F
(
D˜ − 1, p˜i(s, 0), q˜i(s, 0), θ
)
− F
(
D˜ − 1, p˜i(s, pN), q˜i(s, pN), θ
)]
,
(A.16)
where p˜i(s, x) = pS(1− x)p˜i1(s) + (1− pS)p˜i2(s) and q˜i(s, x) = 1− pSx− p˜i(s, x), with
p˜21(s) = pN(1− ε)(1− s1) + (1− pN)[p˜V (1− ε)(1− s2) + (1− p˜V )(1− s3)],
p˜22(s) = pN(1− ε)(1− s4) + (1− pN)[p˜V (1− ε)(1− s5) + (1− p˜V )(1− s6)],
p˜51(s) = p˜V (1− ε)(1− s2) + (1− p˜V )(1− s3) and
p˜52(s) = p˜V (1− ε)(1− s5) + (1− p˜V )(1− s6).
To simplify the exposition we write (A.16) as
ψˆi(θ, s) = p˜
−1
V ∆0,pNF
(
D˜ − 1, p˜i(s, x), q˜i(s, x), θ
)
.
In the sequel we use, without comment, a similar notation for differences of other functions
evaluated at 0 and pN .
Turning now to the secondary individuals, note that a type-U individual is sampled with
probability pS, in which case it behaves like a type-3 primary individual but with forward
global degree distributed according to DU , otherwise it is unsampled and behaves like a
type-6 primary individual, again with forward global degree distributed according to DU .
Thus
ψˆU(θ, s) = pSF (DU , 1− pˆ3(s, ε), pˆ3(s, ε), θ) + (1− pS)F (DU , 1− pˆ6(s, ε) , pˆ6(s, ε), θ).
(A.17)
Similarly,
ψˆV (θ, s) = p
−1
V [pS∆0,pNF (DV , p˜2(s, x), q˜2(s, x), θ)
+ (1− pS)∆0,pNF (DV , p˜5(s, x), q˜5(s, x), θ)]. (A.18)
To simplify the exposition we write (A.17) and (A.18) as
ψˆU(θ, s) = p
3,6
S F (DU , 1− pˆ(s, ε), pˆ(s, ε), θ)
and
ψˆV (θ, s) = p
−1
V p
2,5
S ∆0,pNF (DV , p˜(s, x), q˜(s, x), θ).
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In the sequel, we use a similar notation without comment.
The above expressions simplify appreciably if the infectious period is constant, say I ≡ ι.
In that case, equation (A.15) implies that
ψˆi(θ, s) = e
−θιfD˜(i)−1
(
pˆi(s, ε) + (1− pˆi(s, ε))e−λGι
)
(i = 1, 3, 4, 6)
and exploiting the PGFs for X˜2 and X˜5 (see (4.13) and (4.14)) yields
ψˆi(θ, s) = p˜
−1
V e
−θι∆0,pNfD˜−1
(
q˜i(s, x) + p˜i(s, x)e
−λGι) (i = 2, 5).
Similar arguments show that
ψˆU(θ, s) = e
−θιp3,6S fDU
(
pˆ(s, ε) + (1− pˆ(s, ε))e−λGι)
and
ψˆV (θ, s) = p
−1
V e
−θιp2,5S ∆0,pNfDV
(
q˜(s, x) + p˜(s, x)e−λGι
)
.
A.5.2 Non-random vaccine
Note that now
(A
(i)
j |X˜ij, I) ∼

Bin(X˜ij, 1− e−λGI) if i, j ∈ {3, 6},
Bin(X˜ij, 1− e−aλGI) if i ∈ {3, 6}, j ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5),
Bin(X˜ij, 1− e−bλGI) if i ∈ {1, 2, 4; 5}, j ∈ {3, 6},
Bin(X˜ij, 1− e−abλGI) if i, j ∈ {1, 2, 4, 5}.
(A.19)
For i ∈ {1, 3, 4, 6}, let
aˆi(s) =
6∑
j=1
pˆijsj, bˆi(s) =
∑
j=1,2,4,5
pˆij(1− sj) and cˆi(s) =
∑
j=3,6
pˆij(1− sj).
Suppose that i ∈ {3, 6}. Then, arguing as in the derivation of (A.14),
E
[
sA
(i) |D˜(i), I
]
=
(
aˆi(s) + bˆi(s)e
−aλGI + cˆi(s)e−λGI
)D˜(i)−1
,
whence
ψˆi(θ, s) = EI
[
e−θIED˜(i)
[(
aˆi(s) + bˆi(s)e
−aλGI + cˆi(s)e−λGI
)D˜(i)−1]]
. (A.20)
Arguing as in the derivation of (A.9) then yields that
ψˆi(θ, s) = G
(
D˜(i)− 1, aˆi(s), bˆi(s), cˆi(s), θ, a, 1
)
.
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Similarly, for i ∈ {1, 4},
ψˆi(θ, s) = G
(
D˜(i)− 1, aˆi(s), bˆi(s), cˆi(s), θ, a, b
)
.
Suppose that i = 5. Then, using (A.19),
E
[
sA
(5)|X˜5, I
]
=
∏
j=3,6
(
e−bλGI + (1− e−bλGI)sj
)X˜5j ∏
j=1,2,4,5
(
e−abλGI + (1− e−abλGI)sj
)X˜5j
.
Invoking (4.14) now gives
ψˆ5(θ, s) = p˜
−1
V E
[
e−θI∆0,pNfD˜−1
(
gˆ5(h
F
5 (s, I), x)
)]
, (A.21)
where hF5 (s, I) = (h
F
51(s1, I), h
F
52(s2, I), . . . , h
F
56(s6, I)), with h
F
5j(s, I) = e
−bλGI+(1−e−bλGI)s
if j = 3, 6 and hF5j(s, I) = e
−abλGI + (1 − e−abλGI)s if j = 1, 2, 4, 5; and gˆ5 is as defined in
Section 4.5. A simple calculation now shows that
gˆ5
(
hF5 (s, I), x
)
= aˆ5(s, x) + bˆ5(s, x)e
−abλGI + cˆ5(s, x)e−bλGI , (A.22)
where aˆ5(s, x) = pS(1 − x)[p˜V s2 + (1 − p˜V )s3] + (1 − pS)[p˜V s5 + (1 − p˜V )s6], bˆ5(s, x) =
pS(1− x)p˜V (1− s2) + (1− pS)p˜V (1− s5) and cˆ5(s, x) = pS(1− x)(1− p˜V )(1− s3) + (1−
pS)(1− p˜V )(1− s6). Arguing as in the derivation of (A.9) now gives, for i = 5,
ψˆi(θ, s) = p˜
−1
V ∆0,pNG
(
D˜ − 1, aˆi(s, x), bˆi(s, x), cˆi(s, x), θ, a, b
)
. (A.23)
A similar argument shows that (A.23) holds also for i = 2, with aˆ2(s, x) = pS(1−x){pNs1+
(1 − pN)[p˜V s2 + (1 − p˜V )s3]} + (1 − pS){pNs4 + (1 − pN)[p˜V s5 + (1 − p˜V )s6]}, bˆ2(s, x) =
pS(1− x)[pN(1− s1) + (1− pN)p˜V (1− s2)] + (1− pS)[pN(1− s4) + (1− pN)p˜V (1− s5)] and
cˆ2(s, x) = (1− pN)(1− p˜V )[pS(1− x)(1− s3) + (1− pS)(1− s6)].
Expressions for ψˆU(θ, s) and ψˆV (θ, s) are derived in exactly the same way as with an
all-or-nothing vaccine, yielding
ψˆU(θ, s) = p
3,6
S G
(
DU , aˆ(s), bˆ(s), cˆ(s), θ, a, 1
)
and
ψˆV (θ, s) = p
−1
V p
2,5
S ∆0,pNG
(
DV , aˆ(s, x), bˆ(s, x), cˆ(s, x), θ, a, b
)
.
As usual, the above expressions simplify if I ≡ ι. Equation (A.20) then implies that, for
i = 3, 6,
ψˆi(θ, s) = e
−θιfD˜(i)
(
aˆi(s) + bˆi(s)e
−aλGι + cˆi(s)e−λGι
)
,
which also holds for i = 1, 4, provided λG is replaced by bλG. Further, exploiting (A.21),
(A.22) and similar equations for ψˆ2(θ, s), gives, for i = 2, 5,
ψˆi(θ, s) = p˜
−1
V e
−θι∆0,pNfD˜−1
(
aˆi(s, x) + bˆi(s, x)e
−abλGι + cˆi(s, x)e−bλGι
)
.
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Further,
ψˆU(θ, s) = e
−θιp3,6S fDU
(
aˆ(s) + bˆ(s)e−aλGι + cˆ(s)e−λGι
)
and
ψˆV (θ, s) = p
−1
V e
−θιp2,5S ∆0,pNfDV
(
aˆ(s, x) + bˆ(s, x)e−abλGι + cˆ(s, x)e−bλGι
)
.
A.6 Local susceptibility set size
In this section we give formulae for the probability mass functions of local susceptibility
sets. Consider first the model without vaccination and recall the definition of M (n) in
Section 2.2.2. Then it follows directly from Ball (2000, Lemma 3.1) (see also Ball and
Neal (2002, Lemma 3.1), which gives the same result but not in terms of Gontcharoff
polynomials) that
P (M (n) = k) = (n− 1)[k]qn−1−kk+1 Gk+1(1|V ) (k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1), (A.24)
where qi = φI(λLi) and V = (qi+1 : i = 0, 1, . . .).
Consider next the model with a non-random vaccine action and recall the definition of
M
(n,v)
A = (M
(n,v)
AU ,M
(n,v)
AV ) (A ∈ {U, V }) in Section 3.3. It is convenient to now use a
different notation. For n = (nU , nV ) ∈ Z2+, let Mˆ
(n)
U = (Mˆ
(n)
UU , Mˆ
(n)
UV ), where Mˆ
(n)
UU and
Mˆ
(n)
UV are the numbers of unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals, respectively, in the local
susceptibility set of an unvaccinated individual, i∗ say, who resides in a household containing
nU other unvaccinated individuals and nV vaccinated individuals, so the household has
size nU + nV + 1. Note that Mˆ
(n)
UU does not include the individual i
∗. Define Mˆ
(n)
V =
(Mˆ
(n)
V U , Mˆ
(n)
V V ) similarly, but for a vaccinated individual. Hence, to connect with the notation
in Section 3.3, M
(n,v)
U = Mˆ
(n−1−v,v)
U and M
(n,v)
V = Mˆ
(n−v,v−1)
V . For n ≥ 0 and A ∈ {U, V },
the probability mass function of Mˆ
(n)
A can be derived using the same argument as in the
proof of Lemma 3.1 in Ball (2000). For brevity, we omit the details and just state the
result.
For j = (jU , jV ) ≥ 0, let qj = (qUj , qVj ), where qUj = φI(λL(jU +bjV )) and qVj = φI(aλL(jU +
bjV )). Let 1U = (1, 0) and 1V = (0, 1). Then, for n ≥ 0 and A ∈ {U, V },
P (Mˆ
(n)
A = k) = n[k]q
n−k
k+1A
Gk(1|V A) (0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1A), (A.25)
where V A = (vAj : j ≥ 0) has components vAj = qAj+1A .
In the model with an all-or-nothing vaccine action we can calculate the mass function of
M
(n,v)
A by conditioning on the number, vS say, of the v vaccinations that are successful.
The mass function of M
(n−vS ,v−vS)
A can then be calculated as above, but with q
U
j = q
V
j =
φI(λL(jU + jV )).
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A.7 Mean local epidemic size
The mean single-household epidemic final size µn(λL), defined in Section 2.2.1, is given in
terms of Gontcharoff polynomials by
µn(λL) = n− 1−
n−1∑
i=1
(n− 1)[i]qn−ii Gi−1(1|V ), (A.26)
where qi = φI(iλL) and V = (qi+1 : i = 0, 1, . . .); cf. Lefe`vre and Picard (1990, Corol-
lary 3.3).
Finally, we consider the means µ(n,v)(A,A′) (A,A′ ∈ {U, V }) defined in Section 3.3. Again
it is convenient to use a different notation. For n = (nU , nV ) ≥ 0, let µˆ(n)(U,U) and
µˆ(n)(U, V ) denote respectively the mean number of unvaccinated and vaccinated suscep-
tibles that are ultimately infected in a single-household epidemic with 1 initial infective,
who is unvaccinated, nU unvaccinated susceptibles and nV vaccinated susceptibles. Define
µˆ(n)(V, U) and µˆ(n)(V, V ) similarly, for when the initial infective is vaccinated. Thus, to
connect with the notation in Section 3.3, for A ∈ {U, V }, µ(n,v)(U,A) = µˆ(n−1−v,v)(U,A)
and µ(n,v)(V,A) = µˆ(n−v,v−1)(V,A). Suitable differentiation applied to Theorem 3.5 of
Ball (1986), or Corollary 4.4 of Picard and Lefe`vre (1990), yields that, for n ≥ 0 and
A,A′ ∈ {U, V },
µˆ(n)(A,A′) = nA′ −
n∑
k=1A′
n[k]q
n+1A−k
k Gk−1A′ (1|V A
′
), (A.27)
where qk (k ≥ 0) and V A (A ∈ {U, V }) are as in (A.25).
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